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STOWAGE - BLK II 
- SKYLAB 
- MOD SKYLAB Ix 
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SERV ICE MODULE i 
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EXPERIMENTS - SCIENTIFIC INSTR. MODULE 
- LUNAR SOUNOER I I j x x 
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- REMOTE CTR DOORS 
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REMARKS 
M I 5S I ON UN IQUE DIFFERENCES 
SECTOR I 
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DIFFERENCES SPACECRAFT 
SERVICE MODULE (CON'Tl-"-----~T" -114-f1 
SPS - PUGS - FLT X I X 
- PUGS - GRD USE ! X 
- 4 PROP/2 He TANKS X i 
- 2 PROPII He TANK ! X 
ECS - HEATERS DEACTIVATED 
- COLD PLATES - EXP 
- COLDPLATES - ATS-6 
RCS - PSM 

















- INCREASED CORK 
- ADD ITiONAL CORK 
X I ~ QUADS AND SM 
f 
COMM - RRT 
- ATS-6 POWER AMP SYSTEM 
'-HGA 
EPS - 2 FUEL CELLS 
- DESCENT BATTERIES 
- 3 FUEL CELLS 
-WATER TANK 
- 3rd CRYO SHELF 
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"'--------i 110 '\111 ! 114 I i 118 ,
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PANELS - JED I SONABLE 
- DEPLOYABLE 
- LEM 
TRUSS - STAB I LlZER 
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DOCKING SPACECRAFT 
DOCKING MODULE COMPLETE 
INTERNAT IONAL DOCKING SY STEM 
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UV ABSORPTI ON 
MA-059 
MU L Tl PU RP OS E 
FURNACE 
MA-OlO 




FUNGI -Y TANK SHIELD 
eM STOWAGE 
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AR-002 - MICROBIAL EXC 
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SY-'1LAB STOWAGE LOCKERS 
• ADD Ct-1 EXPERI~1ENI 
PROVISIONS 
• ADD ATS-6 EQUIPM~MT r~Y 3 
• ADD HEATERS & 
CONTROL WIRitlG 
• MODIF~ HIGrl GA • 
ANTET.-I S"SlT" 
• DELETE SPS ST~Vi\_;E 
TANK~. ~~N[ He TA::Y, 
& Pl!r;~ L.J.,TR0L U~1I7 
• ulLEiE.: ~:r_ iUf{t1 
ENHANCEMENT 
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ADD EXPERIMENT CONTROL PANEL 
MODIFY CONTROLS & DISPLAYS 
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Df~ EXTERIOr, I\RRAIGEfI:n 
i 
TANK COVER (2) ~ 
MA-059 UV SPECTROMETER 
• 
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MULTIPLE OPERATION DOOR 
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SIGN!FICANT CONFIGURATION DIFFERENCES 
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S C III 
RESCUE EQUIPMENT 
RESCUE HELMET (2) 
RESCUE FOOT RESTRAINT STRAP (2) 
RESCUE HARNESS ASSY (2) 
'I~ Space DIVIsion .~ Rockwell International 
POWER CAB 
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SIGNIFICANT CONFIGURATION DIFFERENCES 
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PYRO BUS TIE CIRCUIT BREAKER 
rMAIN RELEASE, 
--GROUP 4- PYRO A PYRO B ~ 
~~~~ ~~~ ~ 
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PYRO BUS TIE CIRCUIT 
PNL 101 PYRO BUS TI E CIRC~Ui'IITT~AijD)ijD:rITr;IlCOiNN------============ 
nYRO~ LDEC A MESC A --1 r-= -- f -- MAIN CHUTE S~ PYRO BUS I RELEASE 
I 0 ,C>-I---t---------~--=:A---,- PYRO A 
I 20A I L: 0 I --0---.. TO 
CB16 I ~ • RCS, (ABORT) L I 7.5 A C~UTE 
BAT BUS A rn;EQ EvENTs--l : ~DOCK RING SEP - - ---.J CB48 
TO PYRO BUS CONT SYS - I 0-:1 DOCK PROBE RET 
TIE PYRO A I DM/SLA SEP 
I I I 
I SAFE I MTR 
I 
BAT BUS B 
TO PYRO BUS 
TIE 











I CD0005V i 
I CD0006V I L--~l 
DM/SLA SEP 




I DOCK PROBE RET 
~~ROBB PNL 8 I ~DO~K RING SEP r-t~ MAIN CHUTE 
L 
Q I r-+ RCS (ABORT) I RELEASE 
O'cr----,r---+---------i-L.::-:-' I ~ PYRO B 
20A I I·: I -+ ~ TO 
CB17 L-~ I ~ I 7.5A CB49 CHUTES 
_ _ 
. PNL 101 - - - PYRO BUS I - ----' 
PNL 250 LDEC B - -
PNL 229 
MESC B 
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S~l CORK PROTECTION FOR 600-SECOND +X Sf'1 RCS BURN 
====::=J:DIPI~ :I[J~ :D~ l[llJ, I.C :. C I ~
I.. QUAD C QUAD D • I 
.. ~ CORK 
SHIELDS 
QUADS A&B SJMILAR 
North American 
Aerospace Operations 
41~ Space Division p.~ Rockwell International 
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CSM III LEV AT LAUNCH 
CSM III LEV AT MOTOR BID 
(HIGH ALTITUDE ABORT) 
CSM III CM AT LAUNCH 
CSM 111/DM-2/SLA-18 AT 
ORB IT INSERTION 
- - --- - ----.--~.----.-
North American 
Aerospace Operations 
ASTP csr~ III FRR 
MASS PROPERTIES SUr'1f1ARY 
SIC AT ORBIT INSERTION~ LEV & CM PREDICTED WEIGHT/CG 






XA Y Z 
CIN. ) (IN. ) CIN. ) 
1148.1 -0.08 3.75 
1123,7 -0,02 4.12 
1040.9 -0,18 5.72 
- - -
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES 
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CSM 116 SUMMARY 
ASTP CSM III FRR 
SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES 
• DOCKING PROBE CAPTURE ANOMALY 
• UP DATA LINK ERRONEOUS COMMANDS 
• RCS PROPELLANT QUANTITY SENSOR FAILURES (TWO) 
• QUAD B ENGINE PACKAGE TEMPERATURE SENSOR FAILU
RE 
• SECONDARY EVAPORATOR OUTLET TEMPERATURE MEA
SUREMENT FAILURE 
• SECONDARY RAD IATOR HEATER SHORT 
• SU IT TO CAB IN NEGATIVE DELTA PRESSURE 
• CM RCS FUEL TANK BLADDER LEAKAGE 
North American 
Space Operations 




~ ... ~ 
l 
1 
....... -. *".:. W'N .N·'·"'N '"'~--"-""'~-'""'''' -~""-"~~"~ .. ..cJ[_., .... ,", ... _ .. ,._, ......... __ '- ~ 
<j 
j 
~~,n _ _ 
"""T'":- 1IIr""' .... • .. ~ 
- ~,,-~ \ ... ~ .... _T .... 














ASTP CSM III FRR 
SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES 
CSM 117 SUMMARY 
• RCS QUAD B LEAKAGE 
• RCS QUAD D LEAKAGE 
• PSM OXIDIZER MANIFOLD PRESSURE DROP 
• C02 SENSOR MASTER ALARMS 
• H2 CRYOGEN I C TANKS CONTROL REVERSAL 
• UP DATA LINK INOPERATIVE COMMAND 
• ECS WATER GLYCOL LEAKAGE 
North American 
Space Operations 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES 
CSM 118 SUMMARY 
~ 
, 
• SPS OXIDIZER SUMP TANK MEASUREMENT ANOMALY 
• QUAD B FUEL ISOLATION VALVE INTERNAL LEAK 
• CM RCS HELIUM PRESSURE DECAY 
• ENTRY BATTERY A TO BATTERY BUS A INTERMITTENT CIRCUIT BREAKER 
North American 
Space Operations 
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ANOMALY: 
SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES - CSM 116 
DOCKING PROBE CAPTURE ANOMALY 
• UNABLE TO CAPTURE AFTER IN ITiAl SOFT DOCK AND SEPARATION 
• HARD DOCK ACH IEVED BY CONTINGENCY JUMPER (BYPASS CAPTUREI 
ANAlYS IS: 
• INFLIGHT INSPECTION SHOWED ONE HOOK OPERATION STICKY IN RETRACT POSITION 
• CAUSED BY EITHER CONTAM I NATION OR INTERFERRNCE BETWEEN HOOK AND COVER 
CORRECTIVE ACTION: 
, INCREASED HOOK TO COVER CLEARANCE 
• ADDED DETAilED LATCH FUNCTIONAL C/O SUBSEQUENT TO ATP - 27 INSPECTION POINTS 
• MODIFIED PYRO COVER AND RELEASE HANDLE TO ALLOW CONTINGENCY DOCKING 
WITHOUT CSM DEPRESSURIZATION 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
~I~ Space Division p.~ Rc.:"welllnter'1dtJo;~a, 
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ANOMALY: 
• A'_">1r'_'~_' ____ '~' • -'''--'1"-'.''''- ,; 
SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES - CSM 116 
UDL ERRONEOUS COMMAND ANOMALY 
I 
• UPLINK COMMAND PDSE STAtHli RESULTED IN A DSE START PLUS AN 
FM TRANSMITTER OFF 
ANALYS IS: 
• POST FLIGHT TESTS REVEALED SHORTED DIODE 
CORRECTIVE ACTION: 
• KSC CHECKOUT OPERATIONS MODIFIED TO DETECT OFF-NOMINAL RELAY RESPONSES 
• DIODE X-RAYS REVIEWED FOR ASSEMBLY QUALITY 
• eSM III UDL HAS ONE QUESTIONABLE D lODE IN REGI STER/PROGRAMMER NO. 20 
• DATA REG I STER LOSS WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF AB ILiTY TO UPDATE eTE 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
41~ Space Division 













t!.......,',' •. • .. '" .. ~,~_~ .•. ~, .~ ...... ,, __ .. , ....... ~, ... ,. 
.. J ..... ,,~- ~'-"-~~~""""'""-""".-A..-.:...~._~.... .. __ ,L_ ...... , __ ._.~ ..... ~.,_,_._ ••• _ .. __ "'_. ~ 
~~......,~. - - :' ..... --.- ""'''"l-.''- ~ .~.......-~-~~ ... 
r 
'". ~-











~'" '\~:t' - .. --.--::::.....-'::..:::~:l'~:;_".k"..,..,"" ... < .... _ 
ANOMALY: 
.... 
SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES - CSM 116 
RCS PROPELLANT QUANT ITY SENSOR FA ILURES 
I 
• QUAD A AND PSM QUANTITY MEASUREMENTS INDICATED OFF SCALE HIGH 
, 
ANALYSIS: 
• SENSORS SUBJECT TO DAMAGE FROM L1GHTN ING STR IKE 
.~ 
• MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF FAILURE IS LIGHTNING STRIKE ONE DAY PRIOR TO LAUNCH 
• MEASUREMENT FAILURE UNDETECTED FOLLOWING LIGHTNING STRIKE DUE TO FULL 
RCS TANK LOADS 
CORRECTIVE ACTION: 
• NONE REQUIRED - GROUND CALCULATIONS ARE PRIME MODE OF DETERMINING PROPELLANT 
QUANTITY ON BOARD 
• LIGHTNING PROTECTION HAS BEEN ADDED AT KSC 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
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SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES - CSM 116 
QUAD B ENGINE PACKAGE TEMPERATURE SENSOR FAILURE 
ANOMALY: 
• QUAD B ENG INE PACKAGE TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT IND ICATED OFF 
SCALE HIGH 
ANALYSIS: 
• MOST PROBABLE FAILURE MODES 
• OPEN IN SENS ING ELEMENT 
• SHORT TO GROUND IN ANY OF THREE INTERCONNECTING WIRES 
CORRECTIVE ACTION: 
• NONE REQUIRED - ENGINE QUAD HEATER THERMOSTATICALLY CONTROLLED 
TO ASSURE ADEQUATE ENGINE TEMPERATURE FOR SAFE FIRING 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
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SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES - CSM 116 
SECONDARY EVAPORATOR OUTLET TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT FA ILURE 
ANOMALY: 
• SECONDARY EVAPORATOR OUTLET TEMPERATURE tND tCATED LOWER LIM IT 
ANALYS IS: 
• POST FL tGHT TEST FOUND A SHORTED ZENER D t ODE 
• SHORT WAS CAUSED BY SILICON CONTAMINANT WITHIN THE DIODE GLASS BODY 
CORRECTIVE ACTION: 
• NONE REQU I RED - SECONDARY COOLANT LOOP PERFORMANCE CAN BE MON ITORED 









I.~_~I -1' 1 . .. 
.... . •. " ... '" n ,. ria.' t. • M $ ...... ,."." _. .• __ ~,~._ .. ~~ .• _~" ... """, ~'''''''''''_' .. <."'L......,J,..,_"'.~~ __ .. ,_ ........ ~:,_.'" __ ~ , ..At _"'-, ~,~ __ ,~_. ~,'~ , ..... , .. ,..;:: .... _-'_~.~.~~. ,_._ .. ~~ ~ 








~,.,.. "Wf" .. -'- -- ~~r:rr:"""" - ... 
I 
-':~1:~:.:.:::':;':~~_-"-"- -,:" ::-7"'::..t:: _ _._:~- ._ ........ ~...-_~::::-::=-=-~~~.-~~=.:~-:~:!.~~=:~" .. ~:. '.-'f<- '~IJ.; .. 
SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES - CSM 116 
ECS SECONDARY RAD IATOR HEATER 
.. --.--.------. -----
---- .-----.-- .. ".-----
ANOMALY: 
• ECS RADIATOR SECONDARY HEATER CYCLED ON WITH CONTROL SWITCH OFF' 
• SECONDARY RADIATOR INLET/OUTLETTEMPERATURES OPERATIONAL WITH POWER OFF 
DISCUSSION: 
• 28 VOLT SHORT REQUIRED TO GET CONDITION NOTED 
• CONTROLLER RELAY WIRING CONFIGURATION MAKES A TERMINAL TO TERMINAL 
SHORT HIGHLY PROBABLE 
CORRECTIVE ACTION: 
• SKYLAB ECS RADIATOR HEATER CIRCUITS DEACTIVATED 
• CSM III ECS RADIATOR HEATER MOTOR SWITCHES PLACED IN THE OPEN 
POSITION PRIOR TO LAUNCH 
North American 
Space Operations 
41~ Space Division 
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SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES - CSM 116 
SU IT TO CAB IN NEGATIVE DELTA PRESSURE 
ANOMALY: 
• NEGATIVE SU IT C I RCU IT PRESSURE DUR ING CREW INSERTION, 
ANALYS IS: 
• POST FLI GHT TEST! NG REVEALED 
• SU IT LEAKAGE UNCHANGED FROM PRE-FLIGHT LEAKAGE 
• SUIT CIRCUIT WITH OR WITHOUT SUITS WAS WITHIN ALLOWABLE LIMITS 
• HI STOR ICAL TEST DATA REVEALS 
• SU IT TO CAB IN DELTA PRESSURE BELOW 2 IN H20 INCREASES SYSTEM LEAKAGE 
• THE RETURN AIR CHECK VALVE SEALING CAPABILITY IS REDUCED AT LOW DELTA 
PRESSURES, RESULTS IN INCREASED SYSTEM LEAKAGE 
• RETURN AIR CHECK VALVE CAN BE SEATED BY CYCLING THE RETURN AIR SIO VALVE 
CORRECTIVE ACTION: 
• NONE REQU I RED - ANOMALY CAUSED BY SMALL LOW PRESSURE LEAK. DOES NOT AFFECT 
SUIT CIRCUIT INTEGRITY FOR OPERATION AT HIGHER DELTA PRESSURES 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
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ANOMALY: 
SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES - CSM 116 
CM RCS FUEL TANK - BLADUER lEAKAGE 
• BLADDER LEAKAGE DURING DECONTAMINATION OPERATIONS 
ANALYSIS: 
• HARDWARE EVALUATION INDICATED: 
• NO EVIDENCE OF BLADDER LEAKAGE PRIOR TO EXPULS ION OF PROPELLANT 
• BLADDER STILL CAPABLE OF EXPELLING ALL OF THE PROPELLANT 
• ANALYTICAL EVALUATION INDICATED: 
• LEAKAGE CAUSED BY ROLLING OF A BUCKLED FOLD IN THE BLADDER 
• SPLASHDOVv,J IMPACT SLOSH ING PROBABLY CAUSED BLADDER DAMAGE 
• SYSTEM PERFORMANCE OR RECOVERY OPERATIONS WERE NOT AFFECTED 
CORRECTIVE ACTION: 
• NONE REQU I RED 
North American 
Space Operations 
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ANOMALY: 
SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES - CSM 117 
RCS QUAD B PROPELLANT LEAKAGE 
• QUAD BIND ICATED EXCESS IVE PROPELLANT "USE
11 THREE HOURS AFTER LAUNCH 
ANALYSIS: 
• MALFUNCTION ANALYSIS DETERMINED THAT OXIDIZER WAS LEAKING DOWNSTREAM 
OF PROPELLANT ISOLATION VALVES 
• MOST PROBABLE CAUSE OF LEAK WAS ENGINE VALVE SEAT CONTAMINANT 
• LEAKAGE INDICATED VALVE OPEN 25% - REQUIRES. 005 PARTICLE 
• 5-15 MICRON FILTERS 2 FEET UPSTREAM OF ENG INE VALVES 
• 165 MICRON FILTERS AT ENGINE VALVE - CAN PASS .005 PARTICLE 
CORRECTIVE ACTION: 
• ADDED Res PURGE BURN PROCEDURE TO FLIGHT PLAN 
North American 
Space Operations 
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ANOMALY: 
SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES - CSM 117 
RCS QUAD D OXIDIZER LEAKAGE 
• QUAD D ENGINE PACKAGE TEMPERATURE INDICATED DECREASE ON MISSION DAY SIX 
ANALYSIS: 
• MALFUNCTION ANALYSIS DETERMINED THAT OXIDIZER WAS LEAKING DOWNSTREAM OF PROPELLANT ISOLATION VALVES 
• ANALYSIS OF RCS AND SPS TEMPERATURES AND PRESSURES INDICATED OXIDIZER WAS VENTING WITH IN THE ENG INE MOUNTING STRUCTURE, MOVING THROUGH BAY 5 INTO THE TUNNEL AREA AND EXITING THROUGH THE LOWER BULKHEAD NEAR THE SPS ENG INE 
• HARDWARE EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
• IMPROPERLY TORQUED DYNATUBE FITTING FITS FA ILURE MODE ~ BUTYL RUBBER O-RING DEGRADES IN OXIDIZER AT ELEVATED TEMPERATURE 
• O-RING DEGRADATION T1MElINE AND LEAKAGE RATES REPRODUCED BY TEST 
• FINGER-HGHT DYNATUBE FITTING WILL PASS HELIUM LEAK TESTS 
CORRECTIVE ACTION: 
• CSM III, 119, AND SPARE QUAD FITTINGS WERE TORQUE CHECKED 
North American 
Space Operations 
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CM III ISSUE: 
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SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES 
DYNATUBE FITTING MOVEMENT 
I 
--
• CM B Res NEGAT IVE ROll ENG INE FUEL DYNATUBE FITTING MOVEMENT 
BACKGROUND: 
• WHilE WORKING IN ACCESS DOOR CM 8 THE TECHNICIAN INADVERTENTLY 
EXERTED IJCONS I DERABlE FORCE" ON THE FLEX LINE TO THE ENG INE 
• DURING THIS OPERATION THE LINE WAS NOTED TO MOVE INBOARD, IN THE 
NUT TIGHTENING DIRECTION ABOUT 112 INCH 
• THE NUT WAS TORQUED TO 30 FT/LB WITH NO MOVEMENT OF THE B-NUT NOTED 
• BREAKAWAY TORQUE WAS MEASURED AT 28.3 FT-LB 
. ····:-::.-:.:-:c-x:.·-
• THE UN IT WAS DEMATED AND INSPECTED WITH NO MEeHAN ICAl ANOMALIES NOTED 
• THE UNIT WAS RECONNECTED AND SUCCESSFULLY LEAK TESTED WITH HELIUM AT 40 PSIG 
• SUBSEQUENT LEAK CHECK AT 300 PSIG WAS WITHIN SPEC 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
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SKYlJ\B FLIGHT ANOMALIES 
DYNATUBE FITTING MOVEMENT (CON'T) 











1"'1 ~ll".i I 'I '\ 
i1 









• IT IS POSS I BLE TO ROTATE THE FITTING IN THE NUT WHEN PROPERLY TORQUED 
• SOME SLiGHf ROTATION WILL NOT IMPAIR THE CONNECTORS CAPABILITY 
TO EFFECT A GOOD SEAL 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
41~ Space Division p.~ Rockwellinternanonal 
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ANOMALY: 
SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES - CSM 117 
PSM OXIDIZER MANIFOLD PRESSURE DROP 
• PSM OXIDIZER MANIFOLD PRESSURE EXPERIENCED AN UNEXPECTED 12 PSI 
PRESSURE DECREASE DUR ING RECONFIGURATION OF THE QUAD A, QUAD C, 
AND PSM PROPELLANT ISOLATION VALVES 
ANALYSIS: 
• MOST PROBABLE CAUSE I S REVERSE LEAKAGE OF ONE OF THE QUAD C 
OXIDIZER ISOLATION VALVES 
• VALVE SEAT DESIGNED TO SEAL IN NORMAL FLOW DIRECTION ONLY 
• LEAKAGE RATE EXTREMELY SMALL 
• SMALL REVERSE LEAKAGE HAD NO DETR IMENTAL EFFECT ON THE SM RCS DUR ING 
REMAINDER OF MISSION 
CORRECTIVE ACTION: 
• NONE REQU I RED - SYSTEM NEVER PLACED IN QU IESCENT MODE 
North American 
Space Operations 
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SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES - CSM 117 
C02 SENSOR MASTER ALARMS 
------------------~ .. -.. -.-------.-~-- .. ------------------------
ANOMALY: 
• UNEXPLA INED MASTER ALARMS FROM C02 SENSOR 
ANALYSIS: 
• HISTORICAL DATA INDICATES PROBABLE MALFUNCTION CAUSED AS THE 
RESULT OF MOISTURE COLLECTING IN OPTICS CHAMBER 
CORRECTIVE ACTION: 
• NO KNOWN METHOD FOR ELIMINATING 100% MOISTURE COLLECTION IN OPTICS CHAMBER 
" ELIMINATION OF NUISANCE MASTER ALARM CAN BE ACHIEVED BY OPENING CIRCUIT 
BREAKER TO C02 INSTRUMENTATION SIGNAL 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
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SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES - CSM 117 
HYDROGEN TANKS - CONTROL REVERSAL 
I 
-
• SYSTEM OPERATION (AFTER LAUNCH) SHOWED TANK NO, I FAN AND HEATER 
CONTROLS OPERATED TANK NO.2 AND VICE VERSA 
• INSTRUMENTATION FOR BOTH TANK, TEMP, PRESS AND QUANTITY WAS NORMAL 
ANALYS IS: 
• HYDROGEN TANKS INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED DUR ING IN ITIAL SHELF BU ILDUP 
RESULTING IN INCORRECT WIRING 
• NOR MAL CHECKOUT PROCEDURES WERE INADEQUATE TO DISCLOSE WI RING REVERSAL 
CORRECTIVE ACTION: (CSM III, 118, 119) 
• END TO END WIRING CONTINUITY CHECK AT SHELF BUILDUP (0/659) 
• CONTINUITY CHECK IN D/289 TEST CELL PRIOR TO POWER APPLICATION 
• REPEAT CONT INU lTV CHECK DUR ING INTEGRATED TESTS 
• TANK NO. I AND NOo 2 CHECKED INDEPENDENTLY FOR PRESSURE RISE DUR ING 
CDDT (IIMANUALJI AND IIAUTOII MODE) 
North American 
Space Operations 
41~ Space Division .,.~ Rockwellinternationa! 36 
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SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES - CSM 117 
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ANOMALY: 
• NO "DSE STOP" COMMAND UPLINK CONTROL 
ANALYS IS: 
• DISSECTION OF SUSPECT K32 RELAY REVEALED A LOOSE METALLIC 
CONTAM INANT (RTC 76) 
CORRECTIVE ACTION: 
• SPEC IAL ADDED RTC TESTS AT KSC 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
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sKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES - CsM 117 




• WATER GLYCOL LEAK FROM SUIT HEAT EXCHANGE VALVE (ITEM 10 46) 
ANALYs IS: 
• POST FLIGHT INSPECTION REVEALED LEAKAGE CAUSED BY A FI BER UNDER THE O-R INGs 
CORRECTIVE ACTION: 
• VALVE REMOVED FROM CsM III; NOT REQUIRED FOR THE AsTP MISSION 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
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SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES - CSM 118 
S PS OX I D IZER SUMP TANK MEASUREMENT ANOMALY 
'''---''_. ---
--- .-~ -- ---- -~~ - ... _*'-
._-- .-- ......... ~ -_0" _. _ ._. ___ .... __ ,~'"~_, 
ANOMALY: 
• SPS OXIDIZER SUMP TEMPERATURE INDICATED LOWER LIMIT (255"K) 
ANALYS IS: 
• REDUNDANT MEASUREMENT REMAINED AT 290 r, K 
• MOST PROBABLE CAUSE IS IC FAILURE (fiA 709) 
• SIMILAR IC'S HAVE HISTORY OF DEFECTS WHICH COULD CAUSE 
IND ICATED FA ILURE 
• IC'S ARE UNSCREENED COMMERCIAL DEVICES 
• FOURTEEN MEASUREMENTS CONTA IN){A 709 IC'S - ALL ARE CR ITICALITY III 
CORRECTIVE ACTION: 
• NONE REQU I RED 
North American 
Space Operations 
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SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES - CSM 118 
QUAD B FUEL ISOLATION VALVE INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
• ONE OR BOTH OF THE QUAD B FUEL ISOLATION VALVES INDICATED LEAKAGE 
IN BOTH DIRECTIONS 
ANALYSIS: 
• MOST PROBABLE CAUSE WAS CONTAMINATION BETWEEN VALVE POPPET AND 
SEAT ALLOWING VALVE LEAKAGE 
CORRECTIVE ACTION: 
• PROCESS SPECS REVISED TO MINIMIZE ACTUATION OF VALVES AND CONFIRM 
VALVES ARE MAINTAINED OPEN DURING DORMANT PERIODS 
North American 
Space Operations 
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SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES - CSM 118 
eM RCS HELIUM PRESSURE DECAY 
• CM RCS SYSTEM 2 HELIUM INDICATED RAPID PRESSURE DECAY 
ANALYSIS: 
• POST FLIGHT CHECKS REVEALED HELIUM LEAKAGE ON THE HIGH PRESSURE OUTLET 
SIDE OF ONE SYSTEM 2 SQUIB-ACTUATED HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE 
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SKYLAB FLIGHT ANOMALIES' - CSM 118 
INTERMITTENT C IRCU IT BREAKER 
• CLOSURE OF CIRCUIT BREAKER FAILED TO COMPLETE ENTRY BAITERY A TO 
BATTERY BUS A CIRCUIT 
ANALYSIS: 
• CIRCUIT BREAKER MANUFACTURED WITH ONE CONTACT IN A TILTED POSITION 
(DETERMINED BY POST FLIGHT X-RAY) 
• TILT PREVENTED NORMAL WIPING OF CONTACTS REQU IRED TO BREAKDOWN 
FILM DEPOSITED DURING LONG PERIOD IN OPEN POSITION 
• NO INDIVIDUAL CIRCUIT BREAKER WOULD AFFECT CREW SAFETY OR MISSION SUCCESS 
CORRECTIVE ACTION: 
• NONE REQUIRED - SC III MISSION DURATION WILL NOT REQUIRE CIRCUIT BREAKERS 
OPEN FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
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ATS-6 POWER AMPLIFIER 
41~ Space Division .,.~ Rockwell International 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
ATS-6 POWER AMPLIFIER 
.-- '-'"'~~r~T ... 
• RESOLUTION OF PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN 
DEVELOPMENT OF ATS-6 POWER AMPLIFIER 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
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CONTROLS: APOLLO DESIGN COMPONENTS 





USBE: APOLLO, MODIFIED FOR ATS-6 & IMPROVED VIDEO RESPONSE 
COAXIAL SWITCH: NEW PURCHASE 
POWER ~~PLIFIERS: NEW DEVELOPMENT PURCHASE 
DIPLEXER: NEW DEVELOPMENT PURCHASE 
HIGH-GAIN ANTENNA: APOLLO, MODIFIED FOR ATS-6 FREQUENCY, HIGH 
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RF IN (7-25 MW) 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
ATS-6 POWER AMPLIFIER SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM SUMMARY 
EVENT PROBLEM 




--.~ .. - --
- - ---
DOl I ATEE LAB ENGINEERING VOLTAGE SURGE REDESiGN TO ADD VOLTAGE SUPPRES-
002 TESTS BAS I CAMP SENSITIVITY S ION NETWORK TO PWR SUPPLY PLUS 
TRANS I STOR FA ILURE LOG RES ISTOR ASSEMBLIES 
VENDOR PWR SUPPLY RES I STOR SHORTED ROCKWELLINASA/RESDEL REINSPECTION 
FAILED ISOLATION TEST TO BRACKET SCREW AND REWORK OF FLIGHT PWR SUPPLIES 
004 ~ SLOW TURN-ON 
005 . 
004 
ANOMALY AT KSC 
CSM BUS GLITCH 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
PS & PA SUSPECT RESDEL, ROCKWELL & NASA FAILURE 
ANALYS IS & TESTING 
PS SUSPECT ANALYS IS & INSPECTION 
EXCHANGE PS 003 WITH SN 004 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
~'II 
it 
ATS-6 POWER AMPLIFIER SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM SUMMARY (CON'T) 
, 
~ 
V ~ ~ ~ 











n 1'1 ,~ ~ 
... 
iii I I' .. ~! 
II f) ~! II Ii 
ti il il 
t;C I 








QUAL VI BRATION 




RES I STOR MOUNT ING 
BLOCK FA ILURE 








LOOSE TERM INAL CORRECT IVE STAK ING 
LOAD, B+ WIRE PonED POWER SUPPLY 
FATIGUE FA ILURE, 
& PWR SUPPLY 
COMPONENTS LOOSE 
LACK OF STAKING 
& MARGINAL 
DESIGN 




SUBST nUTE DELR IN FOR TEFLON 
REPA IRED PWR SUPPLY & CONCLUDED 
QUAL DYNAM IC TEST 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
ATS-6 POWER AMPLIFIER SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM SUMMARY (CON'T) 
EVENT 
DESCRI PTION 
QUAL THERMAL - VAC 
FAILURE -
PART IAL LOSS OF RF 
OUTPUT 
QUAL THERMAL -VAC 
FAILURE -
LOSS OF RF OUTPUT 
& RECOVERY 
QUAL THERMAL -vAc 
FAILURE -
INCREASE INPUT 














RESOLDER TO NEW LOW STRESS 
SOLDER PROCEDURE 
ANALYS IS & lEST CONCLUDES TEST 
ENV I RONMENT OF UNGROUNDED 
INPUT CABLE 
ANAL YS IS & TEST CONCLUDES 
KAPTON INSULATOR SHORT THRU 
HOLE 
41~ Space Division p.~ Rockwell International 
.., 
.. ~ 









:;1 <- -- ..... 
North American 
Aerospace ODe rations 
ATS-6 POWER AMPLIFIER 
BASIC AMPLIF IER MODULE 
.. 
~I~ Space DivIsion 
•• ~ Aockwelllntemal1onal 124AP122 
52 
p . otP.»4 St, _ -
( 
.. ~ ...... "i!""'----
-,,---"'" ,!"~."-,.,,,. •.• ~ 
~ I 
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ATS-6 POWER AlvlPLIFIER VIBRATIO,i TEST FAI LURE 
B+ LEAD li~STALLATIOI~ 
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ATS-6 POWER A~1PLIFIER VIBRATIO;~ TEST FAILURE 
• ___ "r ___ ' __ '. __ _ 
LOOSE COMPONENTS 
CORRECTIVE ACTIO~S 
• RE-REVIEt.I pm~ER AMP SOLDER JOINTS .!? COMPONENTS FOR 
VIBRATION SENSITIVITY 
• STAKE BOTH RF TERMINAL LOAD INSERTS 
.., 
I 
.~-.-- .. .l'!::.'.- • --
~ 
;'1 
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WAS 
R 
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ATS-6 POHEP. N1PLIFIER 
vIBp£ITIO:1 TEST FAILI!~ES 








• USE DELRIN WITH IMPROVED CROSS SECTION 
• DIMENSIONALLY CONTROL HELICOIL INSERT 
• STAKE MOUNTING SCREWS 
• VERIFY BY OFF-LIMIT VIBRATION TESTING 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
ATS··6 POWER AMPLIFIER 
FIRST THERMAL VACUUM ANOMALY 
• RF POWER DROPPED 202 dB 
ANOMALY ASSESSMENT: 




• TEARDOWN INSPECTION REVEALED BROKEN SOLDER CONNECTION AT ONE 
BASIC AMPLIFIER MODULE (OUTPUT HYBRID) 
.. SOLDER JOINT 20 POWER INSPECTION REVEALED SEVERAL CRACKED JOINTS 
• FLIGHT UN ITS 20 POWER INSPECTED AND CRACKED JOiNTS IDENTIFIED 
• SOLDER JOINT STRESS ANALYS IS REVEALED MARG INAL JOINT CONFIGURATION 
WITH SAFETY FACTOR <1.0 
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 
• DEFINED NEW LOW STRESS SOLDERING PROCESS 
• VERIFIED BY COMPARISON TESTING OF OLD AND NEW PROCEDURES 
• POWER SUPPLY JOINTS FOUND ADEQUATE 
• REVIEWED ALL SOLDER JOINTS 
• DESIGN ACCEPTABLE (LOW LEVEL AMPLIFIER & POWER SUPPLY) 
• RESOLDER (BAS IC & INTERMED lATE AMPLIFIER) 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
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ASTP C SM III FRR 
ATS-6 POWER AMPLIFIER 
LOW STRESS SOLDER ING PROCEDURE 
',,: -": . ~-~.-' 
• TRIM, FORM, PRETIN, AND INSPECT COMPONENT LEADS FOR POS ITIVE 
CONTACT TO TRACE 
• FORM LEADS TO PROVIDE STRESS RELIEF 
• INSTALL COMPONENTS WITH LOCATING PINS TO CENTER 
• SOLDER ONE S IDE, AFTER COOLING LOOSEN MOUNTING SCREW AND ALLOW 
BUILT-IN STRESS TO RELIEVE TO ZERO 
• TIGHTEN SCREW AND SOLDER OTHER S I DE - LOOSEN SCREW AND PERM IT LEAD 
STRESS TO EVENLY DISTRIBUTE TO BOTH LEADS 
• TORQUE MOUNTING SCREW AFTER COOL DOWN 
• ADDED HIGH TEMPERATURE STRESS RELIEF BY SOLDERING AT ELEVATED 
TEMPERATURE OF 43 DEG C 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
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ATS-6 POWER AMPLIFIER 
BASIC TRANSISTOR INSTALLATION 
1- 1. 360 F 
1 
,... 1. 75 F 
1 
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ATS~6 POWER AMPLIFIER 
ANALYTICALLY DERIVE9 SAFETY FACTCRS OF SOLDER JOINTS 
COf-1PONErn 
BASIC N1PLIFIER 
Q7J 02 COLLECTOR LEADS 
Q7J Q2 Ef1ITTER LEADS 
HYBRID LEADS 
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ATS-6 PA BASIC Ar'lPLIFIER 
TRA~SISTOR LEAD - COLLECTOR (NARROW LEAD) 
LEAD STRENGTH VERSUS SOLDER STRENGTH UNDER THERHAL STRESS 
--------------- .•. -- --_.-








SOLDER STRESS I 




























I OLD PROCEDURE 
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ANOMALY DESCR I PTlON: 
;" . -r'.~ y"~-",,. , _e_e_e<" err"",-.- _ 
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ATS POWER SUPPLY 
QUAL TEST - TRACE SHORT 
• RF POWER OUTPUT DROPPED FROM 40 WATTS TO ZERO AND INTERNAL 
POWER SUPPLY VOLTAGE SENSOR INDICATED NO POWER SUPPLY VOLTAGE 
• AFTER SEVERAL CYCLINGS OF OFF/ON SWITCHES, UN IT STARTED OPERATING 
• TEARDOWN DISCLOSED EV I DENCE OF SHORT BETWEEN TRACES ON PR INTED 
C I RCU IT BOARD 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
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ATS POWER SUPPLY 
QUAL TEST - TRACE SHORT {CON'T) 
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS AND BENCH TESTS: 
• NORMAL OPERATION WITH INTRA-TRACE RESISTANCE REDUCED TO ';.l/,IOO OHMS 
• REDUCTION OF INTRA-TRACE RES I STANCE TO 8 OHMS REDUCED NEGATIVE 
5 VOLT B lAS TO ZERO, STOPPED OSC ILLATOR OPERAT ION - OUTPUT 
VOLTAGE DROPPED TO ZERO 
• NO SIGN I F I CANT INTERNAL TRAN S I ENTS 
• 3 MIL WIRE ACROSS TRACES PRODUCED MOMENTARY SHORT AND WIRE BURN-THRU 
WITHOUT PCB CHAR 
• PENCIL MARK ACROSS TRACE GAP RESULTED IN ARCING AND PCB IGNITION 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
41~ Space Division p.~ Rockwell International 
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ASTP POWER SUPPLY 
QUAL TEST - TRACE SHORT(CON1T) 
TEST AND HISTORY REVIEW: 
• TEST SETUP USED GROUND ISOLATED POWER SUPPLY. INPUT POWER 
CABLE TO TEST SPEC IMEN ELECTR ICALLY ISOLATED 
• TEST VACUUM CHAMBER VAC-ION PUMP WAS OPERATED AT 10-3 TORR 
WITH RESULTANT ION IZED GLOW AND ARC SHORTS TO CHAMBER 
WALL AND CABLES 
e ION IZED GAS ARC-OVER VER !F!ED IN SUBSEQUENT TESTS AND PRODUCED 
300 VDC TRANSIENTS IN ISOLATED INPUT POWER CABLE 
• SIMILAR FAULT WOULD BE EVIDENT EITHER AT KSC OR SUPPLIER - POWER 
SOURCE GROUNDED 
• CSM TRANS lENT LEVEL JUDGED LESS THAN 50 VOLTS 
• CSM INSTALLATION AND SUPPLIER OPERATION OF 158 HOURS FOR SN 002 
WITHOUT INDICATION OF THIS ANOMALYo TOTAL KSC AND SUPPLIER 
FOR FOUR UN ITS OPERATION TIME WAS 610 HOURS 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
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CONCLU S ION: 
-::tC ~ t .. 
ATS POWER SUPPLY 
QUAL TEST - TRACE SHORT (CONT) 
• TRACE SHORTING CAUSED BY ARC-oVER POTENTIAL CAUSED BY INITIAL 
VAC-ION PUMP OPERATION AND SUBSEQUENT CHARGE POTENTIAL ON 
ELECTRICALLY ISOLATED INPUT POWER LINES COUPLED WITH PROBABLE 
LOCAL CONTAMINATION 
• ARC-oVER POTENTIAL UNIQUE TO TEST SETUP 
• CSM INSTALLATION ELECTRICALLY GROUNDED - THEREFORE SATISFACTORY 
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AN OMAL Y DE S C R I PT I ON: ' 




• POWER AMPLIFIER INPUT CURRENT INCREASED TO 15 AMPS; VOLTAGE, CURRENT 
AND INTERNAL TEMPERATURE DATA DISPLAYS WERE NOISY 
• TROUBLESHOOTING REVEALED THJ\ T THE POWER AMPLIFIER 28 VDC INPUT PIN 
WAS 0.687 OHMS TO CHASSIS GROUND RATHER THAN I MEGOHM MIN 
DISASSEMBLY, ANALYSIS AND TEST: 
• FAULT IN THE POWER SUPPLY - THE POWER SWITCHING TRANSISTOR Q6 
COLLECTOR (CASE) WAS FOUND SHORTED TO CHASS IS WITH A CHARRED HOLE 
IN THE KAPTON 2 MIL INSULATOR AND ARC PITTING ON BOTH TRANSISTOR 
AND MOUNTING BRACKET SURFACES 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
.41~ Space Division p.~ Rockwellinternanonal 
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ATS POWER SUPPLY 
Q6 SHORT (CON'T) 
~ ... - .. ~"""": . -'-
I 
TEST AND HISTORY REVIEW: 













VAC-ION PUMP WAS OPERATED DURING PUMP DOWN - NO IONIZATION OF GASES 
IDENTIFIED AND NO EVIDENCE OF GAS ARCS 
NO SIGN IFICANT TRANS lENT ON INPUT POWER SUPPLY LINE BY FACILITY TRANS IENTS 
TEST SETUP USED GROUND ISOLATED POWER SUPPLY - INPUT POWER CABLE TO TEST 
SPEC IMEN ELECTR I CALLY I SOLA TED 
SIMILAR FAULT WOULD BE EVIDENT AT EITHER KSC OR SUPPLIER - FAULT INITIATED 
AT TEST AREA 
KAPTON RATED AT 7000 V/MIL 
KAPlON WITH HOLE WITH ARC-OVER WITH 420 RMS OR"~~50 VDC TRANSIENT 
ARC-OVER SUSTAINED BY CURRENT DOWN TO II VOLTS 
NO SIGN IFiCANT TURN-ON OR TURN-OFF TRANS IENTS (SN 001) - KAPTON INSULATION 
I SOLATION TESTED TO 300 VDC AT ASSEMBLY - NOT ADEQUATE TO DETECT HOLE 
Q6 SWITCH ING VOLTAGE ON COLLECTOR RANGE FROM 55 TO 64 VOLTS AT 22.8 K Hz 
FREQUENCY 
CSM TRANS lENT LEVEL JUDGED LESS lHAN 50 VDC 
CSM INSTAL. & SUPPLIER OPERATION OF 160 HR WITHOUT INDICATION OFTHIS ANOMALY 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
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CONCLUSION: 
ATS POWER SUPPLY 
Q6 SHORT (CON IT) 
• KAPTON SHORT CAUSED BY ARC ING POTENT IAL DUE TO CHARGE POTENT IAL 
ON INPUT POWER LINES ACROSS HOLE IN KAPTON 
• ARCING UNIQUE TO QUAL TEST SETUP 
• CSM INSTALLATION GROUNDED - THEREFORE SATISFACTORY 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
41 ... Space Division 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
ATS-6 EQUIPMENT SUMMARY 
O\;c.RALL POWER SUPPLY STATUS: 
• DES IGN FUNCTIONALLY ADEQUATE AND CONSERVATIVE 
• DES IGN DEFIC IENC IES CORRECTED 
~ OUTPUT VOLTAGE TRANS lENT AT TURN-ON 
iJ MECHANICAL SENSITIVITY TO VIBRATION 
• CONFIDENCE INCREASED BY POWER SUPPLY REBUILD PROGRAM 
• REBU ILD THREE FLIGHT POWER SUPPLIES 
• REUSE ONLY INDUCTORS, TRANSFORMERS, AND INPUT FILTER AND 
BRACKET HARDWARE 
• ALL ELECTRONIC PARTS IDENTICAL TO INITIAL BUILD 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
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ATS-6 POHER Afl1PLIFIER 
KSC RETEST FOLLm~ING REINSTALLATlotl IN CSf1 III 
USBE AGC SIGNAL """' .... ..-------------
----
--. 
RF DRIVE I 
VOLT SENSOR : I 
TEMP SENSOR .... -t-------t-
DC POWER ~ 
RF DRIVE .. 
VOLT SENSOR ... ~t-------t 
TEMP SENSOR ...... t-------t 
DC POWER ~ 
-PDWER AMPLIFIERS WILL BE VERIFIED AT POINT ([) WITH GSE 
EQUIPMENT BEFORE THE COAXIAL CABLES FROM THE DIPLEXER ARE 
MATED AT P575 & P577 
-USBE AGC DATA TO BE RECORDED FOR BASELINE BEFO
RE 
DISCONNECTING J5 
-DISCONNECT J5 & VERIFY PAl & PA2 RF OUTPUT 
-RECONNECT J5 & VERIFY BY COMPARISON WITH BASELINE
 AGC 
READING (~O.5 dB PLUS TEST EQUIPMENT VARIANCE) 
North American 
Aerospace Operations 
41~ Space Division 
•• ~ Rockwell International 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
ATS CSM POWER AMPLIFIER 
CONCLUS ION: 





41~ Space Division .,.~ Rockwell International 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
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• 111-2.11.2 0 
• 111-2.14.4 0 
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FRRID'S 
GFE AND EXPER IMENT SHORTAGE 
,p GA 02 FLOW RATE 
MAIN BUS A & B CURRENT GLITCHES 
MA-OI4 ELECTROPHORESIS EXPERIMENT 
LIGHT 
\j IDEO TAPE RECORDER 
ATS-6 POWER AMPLIFI ER POWER OUTPUT 
C & W (CREW ALERT) LIGHT 
PANEL 1 DEl FAILED TO RESEr 
LOST AND FOUND 
GSE (CI4-626) ELECTR I CAL POWER SUPPLY 
GSE (SI4-121) WIC REFRIGERATION UNIT 
SPARE FIRE EXTINGUISHERS 
-- ~-~~ .. "" 
.., #. ,... ~ 
I 
--
.:' -.:.~ :':~-:::-:::'~-.: -~. 
CLOSED BY PREBOARD 
CLOSED BY PREBOARD 
CLOSED BY PREBOARD 
CLOSED BY PREB()!\ RD 
CLOSED BY PREBOARD 
CLOSED BY PREBOARD 
CLOSED BY PREBOARD 
CLOSED BY PREBOARD 
CLOSED BY PREBOARD 
CLOSED BY PREBOARD 
CLOSED BY PREBOARD 
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PGA 02 FLOW RATE 
• PGA 02 FLOW RATE HIGH DURING SU IT CIRCUIT VERIFICATION CHECK 
(UNEXPLA INED ANOMALY) 
DISCUSSION: 
• 02 FLOW RATE REMAINED GREATER THAN 0.8 LB/HR FOR APPROXIMATELY SIX MINUTES 
• CORRECTED APPARENTLY BY CREW MOVEMENT DUR I NG TROUBLESHOOTI NG 
• CHECK REPEATED AND RESULTS WERE NORMAL 
• ALL THREE SU ITS AND UNMANNED SU IT C I RCU IT CHECKED AND NO LEAK DETECTED 
• BACKUP CREW CHECKS DURING SECOND CHAMBER RUN WERE NORMAL 
~ MOST PROBABLE SOURCE I SEITHER SU IT, SUIT CONNECTOR OR SU IT C I RCU IT RETURN 
A I R CHECK VALVES IMPROPERLY SEATED 
CONCLUS ION: 
• LEAKAGE CORRECTED--SUITS AND SUIT CIRCUIT VERIFIED AND WILL BE REVERIFIED 
PRIOR TO LAUNCH 
• IF SIMILAR LEAK OCCURRED DURING FLIGHT IT WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE 
CONTINUATION OF MISSION 
North American 
Space Operations 
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~---------- ----- -- - - - - ._---, FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW ITEM UISPOSITION IFRRID) I Customer's Rft'ie w Item DefiniTion Shut t ~'CSM-lll ~-T"I-"""--~-\-'l-ro-nmental Control -I";:~'-'-;'- - -T;~~~;~'~~4 ,I 
I_.;~ ~~e-e-nl-Y/K.E.S. I~"'"~;~ I o~~'ZO/;; 
~ '" ------- V36·610001 
~ .. ~c._ -----,-.-------- ------1 
o c;: "on" Perl Oz Flow riate (UneJqllained An:::o:::ma",l:;Y:..Ll __ _ o 1--, 
tij 0 1 /).Jring PGA verification checks prior tv cabin deccmpression, the Oz flow rate 
,.... did not stabilize below 0.8 lbs/hr. as required. The flow rate continued at 
.D c-,., upper limits for a period of arrroxir.Jately 6 minutes after suit circuit pressure 






FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW ITEM DISPOSITION (FRRID) 
Canlractor's ReYlew Item Resolution Shut 
'
'''''. --'''''' ... ". CSM 111 Environmental Control 2 5 111.2.5.4 
1
(" 
J. M. Ross/SO 695/389 5-23-75 
ar wlaf"~' :-:. ~"f"~ .TI~" 
sic DR 0141 
"-,ILr" ·'.Lr 
PGA 02 Flow Rate (Unexplained .1\nomaly) 
.r ~OL .. lI0" '.:n , ... 1) 'If .... , .. 'Vn (onr ,,'y.r i 0..--.....,.. U • .;.--;-.--qu., ,'-iil 
During the PGA verification check prior to decompressing the cabin, 
the 02 flow rate did not stabilize below 0.8 Ib/hour as required. 
The flow rate continued at upper limits for a period of approx. 6 min. 
after suit circuit pressure stabil~zation. This was considered an 
abnormal length of. time based on prior PGA verif.ications. Real time 
troubleshooting consisted of isolat10n of individual crewmembers f.rom 
the suit circuit.. As "CP" stood up to isolate ItACII (at Panel 301) the 
02 flow rat:e dropped from upper limits to O. 7 ~b/hr and upon positioning 
the suit tlow valve to rlOFFn the flow rate went to upper ~imits (as 
expected) and 23 seconds later the 02 flow rate began dropping from 
upper limits. Upon positioning the suit flow valve to "Full Flow" the 
flow rate had dropped to 0.5 lb/hr and continued to lower limits ( < .21 Ib/hr). The flow rate remained below 0.4 Ib/hr for the next 
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FLIGHT READINESS REVIEI ITEM DISPOSITION (FRRID) 
Continuation Sheet 
""(IlL I .. ~ I "I.I 
PCA 02 Flo\\. Ra.tp (Unexplained Anomaly; 
The PCA verificatlon was l.mmediately repeated for comparlson of rpsul ts. 
The 02 flow rate dropped from upp('r limits upon suit. pressure stabillza-
tion and remaim·d below O.R lb/hr fot th(' neoxt "3 mlnutes at which tim£> 
the suit eirc-uit was depressurizt.>o and the altitude- test was continued. 
Sr.acecrai't SUl.t loop l.ntegrity tests (inclUding umbllicals) both before 
and after th(> al titude chamber run were completely !'oatisfactory. Post-
run tes"ts were performed with the manual suit circ.:Ult return valve both 
open and closed and with a base flow level separc.t~ly establish~d within 
the range of the 02 flow meter. Flow incr-ed:.-€'~ciurlng this la~t test. 
indicated a leakage rate of only O.C) Ib/hr. An dddltional test which 
included wiggling the umbilicals at the panel connections also failed to 
discover any 1eO\~a~e.. L"'"-:.'< checks of the SUl.ts werp also performed 













.'\1 though the commander's suit leakage was slightly out of specification 
(150 seem max.). the indicated leakages were insufficient to have caused 
the problem. Additional test results were within specification and manned 
sui t tests also failed to identify an).' excessive l(>akage. 
Other possible leakage sources, the redundant flappers 1n t.he suit circuit 
return check valves, were also considered, since thpse valves on previous 
spacecraft have occasionally exhibi ted leakage at low del tao pressur4i!'s. 
Th~ history of the flapper valves on CSM III has shown no tendency for 
leakage and the results of the several tests (including those where the 
manual valve was not cycled) would seem to di scount the possibility of this 
item as thp cause. The suit circuit integrity check during the backup 
crew's al~itude chamber run was satisfactory and was accomplished withou~ 
cycling the suit circuit air return valve. l\'ith an apparently greater 
openin9 of the direct 02 valve to assist the pressurization, the time from 
start to automatic decrease in the 02 flow was less than 3-1/2 minutes. 
Al though the source of the problem was not identified, the most likely 
cause is believed to be a leak in the suit(s} or connectors or return 
check valve flappers which corrected itself and was not repeatable. Suit. 
leakage will be checked again prior to launch and reseating of the flappers 
can be accomplished by cycling the valve at an imposed delta pressure. 
The present suits and spacecraft suit loop were judged to be acceptable 
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Original Signed by: J .. M. Ross 









L · ... !,;,w,i,t M' * s .. hHiri' - ''t • +- * ., ....... ~, __ ""'_'i..- .. _ ...... '"'J...""'""'-----.,~~"'_~_ ••. _~ ... ~'"~.~u.~,~~~.~.~~10 ,-" W ." ~.. ~~ ,~~~-.~--~ .. , --~ .. ~ 










FRR I D 111.2 0 802 
MA IN BUS A AND B CURRENT GLITCHES 
PROBLEM: 
• SIMULTANEOUS CURRENT TRANS IENTS WERE RECORDED ON BOTH MA IN 
BUSES A & B DURING K-0070 TESTING (uNEXPLAINED ANOMALY) 
• OSCILLOSCOPE READ INGS OF MAGNETIC TAPES SHOWED CURRENT 
TO BE 32 AMPS ON BUS A & 27 AMPS ON BUS B 
• OSC I LLOSCOPE READ INGS SHOWED MA IN BUS VOLTAGES DROPPED 
L 8 VOLTS 
• SLOW-SPEED BRUSH RECORDER SHOWED TRANS lENT IN ATS-6 
RECE IVED SIGNAL STRENGTH (APPROXo I dB) 
North American 
Space Operations 
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.::;....::-...:.<:...= ...... ~. 
~ 
.. 
IRIG 16 PS A AMPS 
10 AMPS/DIV 
5 MS/DIY 
IRIG 15 PS B AMPS 
10 AMPS/DIY 
5 MS/DIY 
_ .... ro._ .. ,.,.~ 
- .. - ""'-/'" 
FRRID 111.2.8.2 (CO~T) 
MAIN BUS A AND B CURRENT GLITCHES 
CURRENT 
t 
f'1AX 32 A 
~ 
t 
MAX 27 A 
t 
-
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IRIG 19 f1N BUS A VOLTS 
0.9 VOLTS/DIV 
5 MS/DIV 
IRIG 20 r1N BUS B VOLTS 
0.9 VOLTS/DIV 
5 MS/DIV 
FRRID 111.2.8.2 (CONT) 
MAIN BUS A AND B CURRENT GLITCHES 
VOLTAGE 
t 
M{\X 1. 8 V 
~ 
t 
f1AX 1. 8 V 
t 
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FRRID Ill. 2,8,2 (CONT) 
f1AHJ BUS A Aim B CURRErH GLITCHES 
40 
30 
igh BUS CURRENT r-1 I CURRENT GLITCH 
__ I RECEIVER AGC 
10' AGC GLITCH 
L 
o 18 36 54 72 90 
TIME, SEC 

































FRR I Dill, 2.8,2 (CON'T) 
MAIN BUS A AND B CURRENT GLITCHES 




::t::~_- - __ =-=-:=: ::::, .. ~-:-
• NORMAL EXCEPT THAT PANEL 230 WAS MECHAN ICALLY DISCONNECTED AND 
5 ITIING ON RH COUCH FOR CAUTION AND WARN ii\JG TROUBLESHOOTiNG 
• TWO TERM INAL BOARDS IN COAX IAL SW ITCH C I RCU IT TO MON ITOR TRANSFERS 
WITH VOM '5 AS PART OF ATS-6 PA TURN-ON ANOMALY TROUBLESHOOTING 
• SPACECRAFT ACT IV ITY 
• NO PHYSICAL ACTIVITY OR SWITCHING ACTION TOOK PLACE IN COMMAND 
MODULE 
• POSSIBLE ACTIVITY IN PREPARATION FOR OPENING QUAD C 
• ATS-6 PA NO, I HAD BEEN ON FOR ABOUT ONE M INU TE 
North American 
Space Operations 
-41~ Space Division p.~ Rockwellinternatmnal 
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FRRID 111 020802 (CONIT) 
MA IN BUS A AND B CURRENT GLITCHES 
.. 




• IMMED iATE ACTIONS 
• POLLED ALL SYSTEMS - NO ACTIVITf 
• STATUSED SWITCHES AND CB'S - NORMAL 
• VISUALLY VERIFIED ISOLATION OF PANEL 230 AND INTEGRITY OF WIRING 
TO PANEL 
• PERFORMED V ISUAL INSPECTION OF TEMPORARY TEST SETUP AT TB 121 
• TECHNICIAN FOUND NO ACTIVITY IN AREA OF TEST SETUP LEAD WIRES 
• LEAD WIRES WERE IN THEIR ORIGINAL SEPARATED POSITIONS WITH 
NO EVIDENCE OF HAVING BEEN DISTURBED 
• INTEGR ITY OF TAPED ALLIGATOR eLI PS ALSO VER IFIED 
North American 
Space Operations 
.t41~ Space Division .,.~ Rockwelllntern,~t1onal 
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FRRID 111.2.8.2 (CO~IT) 
r~AIrI BUS A Af'W B CUHRE::T GLITCHES 
PANEL 225 PANEL 230 
-? TO OTHER 
ATS-6 
~ CB3 FUNCTIONS 
t .. t TEST JUMPERS ..., .... ' CB5 0'1 20A ko ...,-1 I TB121 A I CB4 5A I I 
C? D2 ----
-- 1- COAXIAL TRANSFER I ... I I ... ..-l.. 1-20A 
K3 ~ .. SWITCH 
J. ...... A4 B4 ; j C28A204 J Kl A2 B2 T~~7 n SET RESET GND . 
i 
I...t- TEST TEST "-TB1 TB2 .. 
~ 
VO~1 VOM I ~ - t - + - r--- ~ 4 T " i .; -.::: TEST 
LEADS 
i 
r.""'7 ~ , 
TAPED ALLIGATOR ~
CLIPS LAID ON FOAM PAD 
-
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FRR I D 1110 208.2 (CON'T) 
MA IN BUS A AND B CURRENT GL ITCHES 
KSC TROUBLESHOOTING AND ANALYSIS: 
• DATA PLAYBACK OF BUS CURRENTS AND VOLTAGES 
• DATA DUMPS OF ALL SPACECRAFT MEASUREMENTS 
• REVIEWED AND IDENTIFIED CIRCUIT BREAKER AND SWITCH STATUS 
• OBTAINED COpy OF SIGNAL STRENGTH RECORD FROM NASA S-BAND RECE IVER 
• REVIEWED POWERED-UP MEASUREMENTS AND MADE LIST OF RETEST CANDIDATES 
II CHECKED PATHS FOR CAPAB ILITY TO CARRY GLITCH CURRENT 
(INDEPENDENT OF DOWNEY ANALYS IS) 
• SCHEDULED AND PERFORMED RETEST OF MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS 
• REMOVED AND INTERNALLY INSPECTED VOM'S USED IN SPECIAL TEST SETUP -
RESULTS NEGATIVE 
• V I SUALLY INS PECTED POWER AND CONTROL WI RING TO PA NO. I -
RESULTS NEGATIVE 
• INSPECTED GSE WIRING FROM SERVICE MODULE TO CI4-484 (H2 & 02 TANK 
PRESSURE IND ICATIONS) 
• RAN MEGGER CHECKS ON GSE CABLING 
North American 
Space Operations 




















FRRID 11102,8.2 (CON'T) 
MA IN BUS A AND B CURRENT GLITCHES 
,. 




• VERIFIED DIODES IN SERVICE MODULE (CRYO CONTROL BOX) 
• VERIFIED DIODES IN TRANSMITIER SELECTOR BOX 
~ PERFORMED BUS FA I LURE CHECK TO VER I FY ALL D lODES 
II PANEL 230 W IRING INSPECTED AND FLEXED WH ILE MON ITOR ING ISOLATION 
• PUT 108 VOLT STEP FUNCTION ON BUS AND VERIFIED NO OBSERVABLE 
CHANGE IN PA SIGNAL STRENGTH 
North American 
Space Operations 
~l~ Space Division p.~ RockwelllnternatJonal 84 
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FRR I D 1110208.2 (CON'T) 
MA IN BUS A AND B CURRENT GL ITCHES 
T DOWNEY ANALYS IS: 
.-
(--~. 
• ANALYZED CURRENT AND VOLTAGE DATA TRACES 
• IND ICATED SHORT WAS IN D 10DED LOAD 
• IDENTIFIED AND ANALYZED ALL ACTIVATED D 10DED LOADS FOR POTENTIAL CAUSE 
• ESTABLISHED FAILURE CONDITIONS FOR ANALYSIS 
• SEPARATE WIRES FROM MN A&MN B MOMENTARILY & SIMULTANEOUSLY 
SHORT ING TO STRUCTURE OR NEGAT IVE 
• REJECTED AS TOO REMOTE A POSS I B ILITY 
• SINGLE WIRE IN DIODED CIRCUIT MOMENTARILY SHORTING TO STRUCTURE 
OR NEGATIVE 
• REMOTE POSSIBILITY - DIFFICULTTO VISUALIZE A SHORT MECHANISM 
THAT WOULD PRODUCE TWO 59 AMP SPIKES AND RETURN TO APPROX. 
20 AMPS AFTER EACH SPIKE 
• PAST EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT WIRE SHORT IS LOW-IMPEDANCE SHORT 
THAT CAUSES C I RCU IT PROTECTIVE DEV ICE TO OPEN 
North American 
Space Operations 
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FRRID 111.2.8.2 (CONT) 
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TYPICAL DIODED LOADS 





AL (AS SHOWN) 
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FRRID 1110208.2 (CON'T) 






• ESTABLISHED FAILURE CONDITIONS FOR ANALYSIS (CON'T) 
• LOAD FAILURE IN DIODED CIRCUIT 
• NOT A POSS I BLE CAUSE - ALL LOADS ENERG IZED DUR ING ANOMALY 
HAVE BEEN VERIFIED TO PERFORM SATISFACTORILY DURING AND 
SUBSEQUENT TO ANOMALY 
• COMPONENT FA ILURE IN D IODED LOAD 
• POSSIBLE - FAILURE OF A FILTER CAPACITOR COULD HAVE CAUSED ANOMALY 
• EXACT MECHAN I SM OF CAPAC ITOR FA I LURE THAT COULD PRODUCE 
SUBJECT GLITCH I S UNKNOWN 
• SHORT IN GSE C I RCU ITS 
• GSE SPACECRAFT POWER CIRCUITS ELIMINATED SINCE LOCATION OF CURRENT 
MEASUREMENTS VERIFIES THAT FAULT CURRENT OCCURRED IN SPt,CECRAFT 
• OUTPUT TO GSE FROM D 10DED LOADS LIM ITED TO CRYO PRESSURE LOW 
IND ICATION 
• GSE WIRING INSPECTED ,A,ND MEGGERED 
• NO SUSCEPTIBLE COMPONENTS IN CIRCUITS - FIRST COMPONENT 
I S lOOK RES ISTOR 
'f-iorth American 
Space Operations 
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FRRID 111 0 20 80 2 (CON'T) 












he., ._bt , .. , .. '&. "'r .. ,,'"dO. 
• ALL NON-D 10DED LOADS WERE ELIM INATED 
# ANALYZED INPUT CIRCUITS TO REMAINING LOADS 
, ELIMINATED ALL LOADS WITH CURRENT-LIMITING DEVICES AT INPUT 
1/ CIRCUIT LINE RESISTANCE CALCULATIONS PERFORMED ON REMAINING CIRCUITS 
1 ELIMINATED ALL LOADS WITH C IRCU IT LINE RES ISTANCE TOO GREAT TO 
ALLOW OBSERVED SHORT 
- REMA IN ING LOADS ANALYZED TO DETERMINE COMPONENT(S) THAT COULD 
FA IL WITHOUT CAUS ING LOSS OF LOAD (FILTERS) 
North American 
Space Operations 
-41~ Space Division p.~ Rockwellinternatlonal 
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FRRID 111.2.8.2 (CONT) 
r'lAIi·J BUS A MID B CURREflT GLITCHES 
MN A 
LINE RESISTANCE TOO T 
GREAT TO ALLOW FAULT 
CURRENT OF MAGNITUDE 
NOTED ________ ) 
MN B 
T ) 







OPEN SWITCH (RELAY CONTACT) 
WOULD ELIMINATE ALL WIRING & 
EQUIPMENT PAST THIS POINT 
SMALL TO WITHSTAND ~ DIODE 
RATING TOO 1 . 1 SUSPECT EQUIPMENT 
FAULT CURRENT~ (WOULD FAIL OPEN) ---L I 
RESISTOR WOULD LIMIT CURRENT 
BELOW FAULT -CURRENT LEVEL -----ii------! 
CIRCUIT ELEMENT BETWEEN DIODES & 
CURRENT-LIMITING COMPONENT EXTREMELY 
SHORT OR PART OF A CIRCUIT BOARD. 
POSSIBILITY OF SHORT EXTREMELY REMOTE 
ITEMS CONSIDERED IN ELIMINATING SUSPECT COMPONENTS 
North Arr,erican 
Aerospace Operations 
.4IIIIIII1~ Space Division p.~ Rockwellinternatlonal 55APl22790A 89 
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02 FLOW TRANSDUCER 
ATS-6. POWER AMP 
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FRRID 111.2.8.2 (CON'T) 
MA IN BUS A AND B CURRENT GLITCHES 
FAILURE EFFECT CRITICALITY 
-.-- _ ... -
0, I -;<t MYLAR POSSIBILITY OF SOME NOISE ON III 
FILM FILTER MEASUREMENT, BUT WOULD NOT t4 
CAPACITOR AFFECT READAB ILITY 
0.22 -,At METALI ZED NONE - A SMALL AMOUNT OF NOI SE III 
PAPER FILTER AT INPUT OF POWER SUPPLY WOULD 
CAPACITOR NOT AFFECT TEMP TRANSDUCERS 
00 37 -)H CERAM IC POSSIBILITY OF SOME NOISE ON III 
FILTER CAPAC ITOR MEASUREMENTS, BUT WOULD NOT 
AFFECT READAB ILITY 
OJ -/<.f CERAM IC (3) LOSS OF ONE CAPAC ITOR WOULD III 
OR 82 -I< t WET SLUG HAVE NEGLIG I BLE EFFECT ON OVER-
TANTALUM (3) FILTER ALL FILTER CAPAB ILITY 
CAPAC ITOR 
1000-pF CERAM IC NONE - 28 VDC POWER USED TO II (MS) 
FI LTER CAPAC ITOR OPERATE RELAYS WITH IN PA, WH ICH 
WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY SMALL 
AMOUNT OF NOISE 
1000-pF CERAM I C NONE - 28 VDC USED TO OPERATE RE- III 
FILTER LAYS WITHIN USBE, WHICH WOULD 
NOT BE AFFECTED BY SMALL AMOUNT 
OF NOISE 
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FRRID 1110208.2 (CON'T) 
MA IN BUS A AND B CURRENT GLITCHES 
CONCLUS ION: 
• UNABLE TO DETERM INE EXAcr CAUSE OF CURRENT GLITCH 
• MOST PROBABLE CAUSE I S FA ILURE OF FILTER CAPAC ITOR IN ONE OF 
LOADS PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED 
• MOST LIKELY UNIT IS ATS-6 PA, SINCE GLITCH IN RECEIVER SIGNAL 
STRENGTH WAS NOTED AT SAME TIME AS CURRENT GLITCH 
• ANALYSIS OF PA SHOWED THAT MOST LIKELY FAILURE WAS FILTER 
CAPAC ITOR IN PA POWER SUPPLY 
• POWER SUPPLY CAPAC nOR INSPECTION AND DISSECTION DID NOT 
SHOW EV I DENCE OF SHORT 
~ IF PROBLEM WOULD OCCUR IN FLIGHT, SWITCH TO REDUNDANT PA 
RESOLUTION: 
• ALL POWER SUPPLIES FOR FLIGHT PAIS WILL BE REPLACED WITH REBUILT UNITS 
North American 
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I" FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW ITEM DISPOSITION ,URID) - -1 
-e. ~- -- - '-'1';"'· T'--;'~'''·''· I .......... ; -- --~ ~ ~, ~~I.-l!~_ • Il~C~rtC.'~ Po.,'. ___ 1 2.3 ! 111.2.8,2_. _____ 1 
"'Cl ~'"""" 1 ,." .. ".,~ !-n •. , : 
eu IluftH' Ruie. Iltm Definition Shut 
o D. ,;reenly/K.L'i. I SR&QA ! 5120/75 -.J 
~ ... ~.; ';;;;".~~'~~ K'-;O;;.-D; S/C-lll-SC-~-O~ 1';~3~~~~OOOl I 
~I~ Mus A&B Current Gil tch"s (Un"xplaln~ .\noma1y) 1 
IJ.1 ll/ft!7.1 at 19:50-4""1: slJ11JltaIteoL:c;. ~litches \'fere obsl:n'l"ti on main bus "Aft 
and "S" OJrrents. GlItches were 32 aml 29 amps in magni tude on Bus "A" and liB", 
re5pectivel)'. Subsequent investigati~r.s hll"d to detennine cause of ananal)'. 
I "(OW"'''o(D &C"OO .. JUITlfloC&TI()ooo 
Submitted for infonnation only. 
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fliGHT READINESS htVIEW ITEM DISPOSITION ,FRRIOI 
Con l f a c 1 Q I .... R·, 1 e. " p - Rt 'J ~ .... .)oe e: 
,<,'1 111 1 q"ctricaJ I'o",,,r ] 2_8 ! 1l.;·.H .. ' 
R. II. Huch I SD 
.1'" C-:''J-75 
'::lIe DR OO"'! 
"'l.\ln I\u ... 1\ .,,\nd t\ Cljrr"ut \'.11t1 }:. .... :I'tll "1.1 ~lr1l"tI '\nnm;\ly} 
(In 11-6-74 at 19:50:47Z simultaneous ,;lltch~~. 12 ampc; Bus. ,\ and 27 
Hus R amps magnitude' ami 20 mlll.is.ec duration ""rrf' observrc1 on main 
Bu!' f\ and H t:urt'rnts .. 
~~:.-;:"';;:: 
Syst(>JTlS that. ""ere actIve at the tlmt' we-r(! poll(,'J to deterMine if' any 
activity in their syst.rm couln have caus~d the observed load. The 
answer was nt."g3tive.. The 5('0 10 the CM was ask{>d if any activity in 
the eM coul,l have ;"ctiviat.ec1 an}' switches or if any oth(>r ac'tivitYr 
not OOing monitored on OIS, took plac{>. His ansW£>r was negative.. The 
sen was asked to chpck the condition of th~ t~st TB setup as d 
possiblt' cause. The> sen reported th,'" setup W35 adequately insulated .. 
The sic CB's were statused and the CB status was normal. 
Specific conditions at tht." time of the glitch ~re: 
1.. Panel 230 was mechanlcal1y removed from structure, and r~5tin9 on 
a right-hand couch. The panel was electrically connected. 
2.. 1'\010 VQM's,two test THiS were installed in the CM interior to monitor 
the voltage on the transfer switch set/reset contact. voltages... The 
test TR' 5 Wer~ connected to TB 121 at the eM. 
3.. ATS-F PA .-1 was powered-Up; it had been turned on by UDL CMJJ 
prior to the gli tch .. 
The two meters (VOMIS) were disassembled and inspect~d for any conditlons 
that could cause the 91itch; the inspection eliminated the meters as 
suspects. 
SM wiring, power and control, to PAts was inspected visually and no 
evidence of damage was noted. 
Diodes in the transmitter s~lector box were verified AS being still 
functional. 
"II'''O_I1'(D ..... _U·.[5! .. 'Ut~£ 
OriginalSigneo by: R. H .. Such 5-30-75 
JoISC rOR ... 20eIJB tAUG 67' NASA-USC 
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FLIGHT READIHESS REVIEW ITEM D!SPOSITION (f~RID) 
Contlnuat1.F S'tee" 
~··r"--------
CSM III Elec~r1cal _.P 111 •• : .. e.2 
o NASA 0 ~D ~-23-75 
... q .... h. flllf 
Main Bus A and B rurrent Glitchec; (l!r.,"~jl.·\lnetj Anomal~'~ 
Gsr and sic w1ring sscciated W4 th In<"a .... S("004,.?;'; :md srooq.:x, OJ and H2 
TKS presc;. low were nspect('d H .. 'S:- "l"..,£.lerf'd).. P,,";.ul tc;: No indicatior. 
of a discrE'pancy .. 5 ncp th,· t1 ~.It- .)f th" 9 J i tr"t-. r ';;((IOq.', and SC0094X 
appear normaL 
With Panel 230 rpmovf>d from noun' .im. strut.:tut(· b1.!~ ,·!rctr:;. cally 
connectpd, and whi]p chpckin~1 bu.; jo;fliaticn t t!1(- c:..r h.-~rn(lss to P~i1el 
~30 was wiggled and metf"r monl ton~d. Th\·!'{ wa. .. nc _'hi~ngp in the> 
rC'ading. The wiring of Pan",! 230 W3~ \lic;<JalJo,. in.;,;u .... ~t(>d and no 
damage was noted. 
A st{>p function of 1.8 VOC drop Wa$ applied Zit. the lnpu't to the PA 
wi th the PA powered up. Thi s funct ion did ro~ aifec"t. the re-cording 
of recelved signal stren9th as. did the Ot191nal -Jlit:ch of Ij-6-74. 
The cause of the problem was not lo':ated positively through trouble-
shooting or analysis. Since circuit protection devices and stringent 
non-flammability requirem('nts preclude jeopardizing cre~ safety, no 
further troubleshootin9 was done. Close scrutiny was maintained 
during the remaining testing for recurrence of the anomaly (n{"ver 
duplicated) • 
Analysis of the current and voltage traces indicated that the ~hort 
was in a dioded load. Possible failure mechanisms were studied, 
including various t.ypes of wire shorts, load failures,,- .nalfunction 
of a component within a load and failures in out.put GSE connected to 
the vehicle. Analysis of these failure condi tion5 indicated the most 
probable cause was the failure of a component inside a load, 
specifi\:ally a filter capacitor since all loads operated normally 
after t!1e incident.. 
In addition to non-dioden loads, the analysi~ eliMinated all loads 
with current-limiting devic~s at th~ input. Circuit line resistance 
calculat.ions were performed on the remain!.ng cireui ts and all loads 
with a line resist.ance t.oo great to permit the obser\,'ed magnitude 
of t.he short were eliminated. The remaining loads were analyzed for 
suspect components 'that. could fail without causing loss or mal.!unction 
o£ the load (i.e., £ilter5). This resulted in identification of 6 
potential loads, includin9 t.he ATS-6 power ampli£ier. 
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FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW IrEI OISPOSiTION (FRRIO) 
ContlnuatlOTl Sllee' 
CS~1 1111'" '·lpC'trieal. Pow('r 1,,·,· 2.M 1l1.2.8.~ 
o h"S. [] ~D tI',,, • •.• 1 5-23--5 
".'!ilr ... Tj* .. r 
l 
~ain Bus r\ and B (urrent ~li tch4?s (1 1nE'>4'lained Anomaly) 
A glitch ~n the:> PF output of th~ ,\T..,-Cl po""er iUIlf/lifier was noted 
caine .. dent wi th th~ btls 911 tch~ Sul,c:(>quE"nt ,·ehic-l", and subcontractor 
testl.ng could not dupllcate the ",non",]y .. 
Vehicle troub~(~shootir.g and analysis.. wnile unable to d{'termin{' the 
~x~ct cause of the currpnt glitch, id~ntif~ed the most probable cause 
of the anc:iialy to be failure of a iilt{'r capacitor in one of 6 loads. 
Thes{> are: ~ui t Compressor Diff Press Transducer 
Temp Transducer Po...:er Supply 
0,2 Flow Transducer 
ATS-6 Power Ampli.!ier 
USBE Power Amplifier 
ATS-6 USBE Power Amplifier 
The RF output glitch in the A1S-~ power ampli£ier coincident with 
the bus 91itGh indicates this load as the most likely cause of the 
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FRRID 111.2.80 3 
MA -014 HECTROPHORES IS EXPER IMENT LIGHT 
PROBLEM: 
• EXPERIMENT NO-GO LIGHT DID NOT TURN ON DURING PREPARATION FOR 
ALTITUDE RUN NO.2 (UNEXPLAINED ANOMALY) 
• ALL PR lOR AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS NORMAL 
• EXPER IMENT WAS A TEST UN IT (QUAL TEST) 
DISCUSS ION: 
• TROUBLESHOOTING INCLUDED: 
G INSPECTION OF EXPERIMENT INTERNAL CIRCUITRY AND REPEATED TESTS IN 
NASA LAB 
• SUBSEQUENT EXAMINATION OF SPACECRAFT/EXPERIMENT INTERFACE 
CONNECTORS, INSPECTION OF ACCESSIBLE WIRING, AND MOVEMENT 
OF VEHICLE WIRING WHILE CONNECTED TO POWERED-UP EXPERIMENT 
• ANOMALY COULD NOT BE FOUND OR DUPLICATED IN LAB OR VEH !eLE 
e FAILURE MECHANISMS WERE CONS.iDERED TO BE: 
• INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF WRONG SWiTCH (OCCURRED DURING 
TROUBLESHOOTING) 
* INTERMITIENT FA ILURE OF VEH ICLE WIRING 
• INTERMITTENT IN FREEZER CIRCUITRY OR AN ISOLATED FAILURE OF THE 
FREEZER POWER SWITCH OPERATION 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
41 .... Space Division 
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FRR I D 1110 2n 83 (CON IT) 
MA-OI4 ELECTROPHORES ~5 EXPER lMENT LIGHT 
CONCLUS ION: 
• MOST PROBABLE CAUSES ARE EITHER AN I SOLATED FA ILURE OF THE FREEZER 
POWER SWITCH TO ACTUATE PROPERLY OR FA'iLURE TO BE PLACED OVER-
CENTER POS ITIVELY IN THE 1I0N'I pas IT ION 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
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m-014 !DR 02' v, TCP-K-OU34. OR ~&\014-4/74-011 ~ rn SIC J 11-5C-0142 V36-4400OI 
------- ._-----
i~f'" ~"'" ~1"'-014. ElectrophoresIs L:creriment Light [Unexplained AnOl.laly) 
Dunn!! Alti tude Ch.unbcr Run n. the ~t\-Ol" (q.,al. Unit) ":\a-Go" light failed to 
illuminate as expected .... hen the experiment's freezer power switch \·'3.S placed 
in the "on" position. The light operated properly during Chamber Run N2. 
Subsequent troubleshooting of the experinent and related (3.1 wiring failed to 
disclose a cause for the subject one-time condition. 
Submi tted for information only. 
~one. 
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fLIGHT READINESS REVIEW ITEM DISPOSITION IfRRID, 
Contlactor's ReYlew Ite!"! ~e~(I;Lot !/"l Shee l 
C~~I III ,. 1·I,ctrlcal Po'<er l :'.e 111..'.8. ; 
R. Bu,hhD T 'l-~I'J-7r; 
sA DR "14~ 
:'-11\-014. Ph.,.C·tTopl'or.· ... l ... IX!,prlm,'nt I "lht .11!H·"l'l .. '\lt~.,l .\nom,'ll~·) 
Th"" r-xp,'rimC>Jlt ~\I-(,:(", lIght -11n not turn on JUT!fU) i rf"'j-l..lT"\tl0n!:o 1:-JT 
altituc:lp Run No. ~. Th~ frN'Z('r c:.""itch \.i.,,- cy,:,lnl ;lOn til{' li~li1t .... ",'lr:p un. 
!t chrl opr-ratC' pro1,prly in Run ;'Il()~ _' .. FolJowinq ("omph·tlon of ttw 
al t ~ tu(i(' runs, t hI" ("T'('rimcnt IN,1.5 rl'!"lOv("(t from t hp '.:-./C .1.nd dp 1 i \·PH·tJ to 
thp expr-riTllPnt l,,,l., for t Tout'ol eshoot:: n.,. 
TToubleshooting condut ted in the N'ASA latJ on ttl(- ,:-xpf'rl.ment con5i.;;,tin9 of 
inspection of tho.- frE"c::'.;wr power =ircuitry nnd rerl~atl .. d cycling of the 
freezer powltr switC~l fail{'d to .. lisclo~l· <lnv t ... ,rdwo.ITP discrepa.n('ips.. Sub-
sequt>nt in~J'('ction of th", sic ?xpt>rirnf'nt intC'r!ac(' conn(>ctor~ ;:t.nd flexing 
of the sic wiring with th(> frl'pzpr powerpd-up also failed to indicatp any 
possible intermittents. Durirg T.S. in the Sic. the :::.CO inadvertently 
actuated thp experiment power switch instead of the experiment freezer 
power switch (adjacent to each other on the experim("nt). lnquiry into 
the possibility of this having occurred at the t;me of the anomaly was 
made and a comparison of the Bus B current data at the time of the anomaly 
and the time of inadve;:tcnt SWl t.:hing was conducted. T!1e data indicated 
no evidence of inadvertent swit ... hin9 at th(~ tiroe of the anomaly. Howl?vpr, 
wi th ~B only on (major portion of experiment power comes from MNA) ~ the 
current drain is relatively negligible and pasi tive indication of proper 
or inadvertent switching would probably not be seen .. 
The possible failure mpchanisms are: (1) inadvertent operation of thp 
wrong switch, (2) intermittent failure of vehicle wirin9 and (3) inteor-
mi ttent. failure in the freezer circuitry or an isolated failure of the 
freezer power switch. 
The most probable causes are considered to be an isolated failure of 
the freezer power switch to actuate properly, or, to be placed positi ... ·"'ty 
overcenter in the ON position. 
AuT"O.Il[D"AA.[P.[S~"TI.TlV( ~ 
Original Signed by: R. H. Buch 5-30-5 
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~";;~;··~:-:;CP-K-OOOS. __ ~S/C lll-SC-OISt> 83~ I 
,--... -l 
Vldeo Tape Recorder (VTRJ .JUnexplarned Anomaly) 
During integrated systems testing per TCP-K-OOOS. good "dumped video" froo: 
th~ vm could not be verified. Subsequent troubleshooting falled to disclose 
a cause for the rerorted condition . 
IftCOMVr .. ot:D &CTIOOCIJ!nT,,.C&TlOOo 
Submi tted for infonnation only. 
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ATS-6 POWER AMPLIFIER POWER OUTPUT 







.. ATS-6 S-BAND POWER AMPLIFIER DELAY IN COMING ON FOLLOWING 
APPLICATION OF DC POWER AND RF DRIVE (UNEXPLAINED ANOMALY) 
'I 
~ B'OTH PAIS EXPERIENCED PROBLEM 
,~ 8 IDENTIFIED OCCURRENCES, PA NO" I 
• 3 I DENTIF lED OCCURRENCES, PA NO.2 
• RF OUTPUT APPROXo 35 dB BELOW NORMAL AND DC CURRENT 
I TO 2 AMPS VS 10 AMPS NORMAL 
• PROBLEM OCCURRED IN PM MODE ONLY 
• SELF-CLEARED, WITHIN APPROX. ONE MINUTE, OR WAS CLEARED BY 
SWITCH ING TO OTHER AMPLIFIER (OR OFF) MOMENTAR ILY OR BY 
SW ITCH ING TO FM DR IVE 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
~I~ Space Division ".~ Rockwell International 
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FRRID 111.2.11.2 (CONT) 
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FRRID 111.201102 (CON1T) 
ATS-6 POWER AMPLIFIER POWER OUTPUT 
SPACECRAFT TROUBLESHOOT ING: 
• INITIAL CIRCUIT ANALYSIS AND DATA REVIEW SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING 
POSS I BLE CAUSES: 
• HANGUP IN COAX TRANSFER SW ITCH 
" HANGU P IN RELAY K -I IN PANEL 230 
" FAULTY POWER CONTROL RELAYS IN TRANSM ITIER SELECT BOX 
• PROBLEM WITH IN THE POWER AMP ITSELF 
• COAX TRANSFER SWITCH REPLACED 
• PROBLEM RECURRED WITH NEW TRANSFER SWITCH 
• INSTALLED VOM1S TO MONITOR COMMANDS TO COAX TRANSFER SWITCH 
" PROBLEM RECURRED WITH NORMAL COMMANDS 
• INSTRUMENTED INPUT DC POWER, INPUT AND OUTPUT RF POWER OF EACH PA 
~ PROBLEM RECURRED WITH INPUT DC OK, INPUT RF POWER OK 
• INTERMITTENT COAX CONNECTOR FOUND AND REPAIRED (PM RF TRANSFER SWITCH 
COAX CABLE) 
• HANGUP NEVER AGA IN OCCURRED 
• COAX WOULD NOT EXPLA IN PROBLEM SINCE HANGUP OCCURRED WITH 





~I~ Space Division p.~ Rockwell International 
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FRRID 11102.11.2 (CON1T) 
ATS-6 POWER AMPLIFIER POWER OUTPUT 
FAILURE INVESTIGATION, VENDOR AND JSC: 
~ HANGUP CAUSES AND MECHANISMS POSTULATED AND ELIMINATED BY TEST 
• EMI INDUCED POWER AMP POWER SUPPLY HANGUP IN LOW OUTPUT VOLTAGE MODE 
• AC VOLTAGES COUPLED INTO SPACECRAFT INTERFACE WI RING -
NO HANGUP OCCURRED 
• INDUCTANCE IN DC SUPPLY WIRING MAY HAVE CAUSED POWER AMP 
POWER SUPPLY OSC ILLATION AND REDUCED DC OUTPUT 
• CALCULATIONS SHOW ABOUT 12 MICROHENRY EACH IN SUPPLY 
AND RETURN WIRES AND BETWEEN CASE AND VGP 
• TESTS WITH 20 AND 100 MICROHENRY IN EACH CAUSED NO OSC ILLATION 
OR REDUCED RF OUTPUT 
• ANALYSIS BY POWER SUPPLY CONSULTANT FAILED TO IDENTIFY POSSIBLE HANGUP 
MECHANISM 
$ NO HANGUPS OBSERVED DURING EXTENSIVE TESTING OF FLIGHT AND ENGINEERING 
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FRR I D 11i.2 0112 (CaN'T) 
ATS-6 POWER AMPLIFIER POWER OUTPUT 
SUMMARY: 
• NO POSTULATED HANGUP MECHANISMS COULD BEVERIFIED BY TEST 
• NO POTENTIAL HANGUP MODES IDENTIFIED BY ANALYSIS OR BENCH TESTS 
• HANGUP ALWAYS SELF-CLEARED OR WAS CLEARED BY CYCLING DC POWER 
OR SWITCH ING TO FM DR IVE 
• NO RECENT OCCURENCES OF ANOMALY 
CONCLUS IONS: 
• IF TURN-DN ANOMALY SHOULD OCCUR DURING MISSION ClEARANCE CAN 
POTENTIALLY BE ATIAINED BY CYCLING DC POWER .. AS AN ALTERNATIVE, 
THE OTHER AMPLIFIER CAN BE SELECTED 
• POWER AMPLIFIERS ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
- "-. ~::' 
~l~ Space Division p.~ Rockwellinternallonal 
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""·;;~;~·::·~CP.K.~~7~.~~~~_=-1!~~:~~:~~. ~~._~ _. 1·~~~~~·~~06l J 
""" ATS-6 Power ","pliner Po"er l).Jtput (Une>'plained Anomaly) 
furing comlHned systems testing per TCI'-~·0070 it was observed that the ATSF 
pa-er amplifier RF outputs did not aheays indicate full power when sl<itched 
on. The condition progressively improved wi th time until it no longer could 
be made to repeat. The cause of thE.' cond;tion could not be determined. 
r --e:CC-O'~~D 4Cnooo JUSTII'CAnoo. 
Sub:'litted f'lr information purposes only 
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FLIGHT READINESS ~tVIE' ITEM DISPOSITION (FRRIDj 
Cantracto,'s PeVI!I Itefll Resolution Sheet 
CS·-1 111 
,. 
~ommunicat ions 1 2.11 111.2.11.~ 
... II. McQuerry/SO 
" 
;/25/75 
sir DR 0055 
.... "t .... ,Ot' 
ATS-6 I'uwer Amp1ifh~r Powpr Output 
'-i ,,~1-fi.-· ... , .. ', ... 0."'/, ~ ... , .... "~"'.'" 
.. -. ~'~;;{' .. 
ATS-6 pOWE'r amplifh·r testlng 'lt KSC indicated that power a."rlifier RF' 
outputs did not a1w~ys indicat~ prop~r full power when s~itched on. Time 
deLa)' from turn-on to full po"'er out ranged from a fE'W seconds to over one 
minute. The- problem was detecte-d on both I'A No.1 and PA No.;,;. In all 
cases, th£> probl('m either cured it.self or wa~ cured by switching mode or 
recycling p(w1er 5wi tch. The condi tion appear(>d to progn"'ssi vf'ly improve 
with time, i.e., it became more difficult to mnke the anomaly occur. 
Initial circuit analysis and data review suggested the following possible 
causes: 
a. Hangup in coax transfer switch 
b. Hangup in relay K-I in panel 230 
c. Faulty power control relays in transmit~er select box 
d. Problem within the power amp itself 
The coax transfer switch was changed OUt. The problem recurred, although 
at a lesser frequency. Instrumentation was installed to monitor commands 
to coax transfer switch and problem recurred with normal commands. 
Instrumentation was installed to monitor input DC power and RF drive 
as We'll as RF' output.. The turn-on anomaly was observed twice wit.h 
normal OC power and RF drive inputs .. 
Both power amplifiers ..... ere removed from sic and return{>d to vendor. 
Extensive analysis and testing was performed at vt?ndor and at JSC on 
the units removed from the sic and on {>nQineerioQ models. The problem 
could not be duplicated and analysis did not disclose any desi9n fratules 
that could explain the anomaly. 
An engineeriOf:;J unit and ·[light power amplifier SN 005 wert" sent to KSC 
and installed in the sic. Extensive testin9 could not duplicate the 
problem • 
Flight power amplifiers SN 006 and SN 004 were received at KSC, installed 
for flight and satisfactol·ily tested during TCP K-8241. The anomaly 
did not repeat. 
Following this testing in K-8241, the power amplifiers were returned to the 
vendor a second time for resolder modifica.tion and rett"st. 
It is concluded that the ATS-6 power amplifiers are acceptable for flight. 
In event the turn-on problem should ocCur during the mission, it can be 
~learprl hv rvrJino the DC Dower switch or bv switching to ~he other amp_ 
"V1t+D_'ltD ...... _[,11(50:: .. 1"",,[ 
Oriqinal Signed by: W. H .. McQuerry 5-30-75 
MSC FORM 201198 (AUG 611 HASA_MSC 
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FRRID 111.2.14.4 
CREW ALERT LIGHT ANOMALY 
PROBLEM: 
• CREW ALERT LIGHT HAD BEEN DEACTIVATED BY CUTTING AND STOWING GROUND RETURN WIRE 
• SCO REPORTED LI GHT ON DUR i NG POWER-UP (TOGETHER WITH OTHER LI GHTS) 
Di SCUSSION: 
• BLANK DECAL HAD BEEN INSTALLED OVER LIGHT BUT ONE EDGE WAS TURNED UP 
(BACK SURFACE OF DECAL I S HIGHLY REFLECTIVE) 
'J ALL LIGHTS EXTiNGUISHED WHEN SWITCH POSITIONED FROM NORMAL TO ACKNOWLEDGE 
~ CREW ALERT LIGHT DID NOT COME ON WHEN SW ITCHED TO NORMAL 
• CONDITION WAS NEVER DUPLICATED 
# TROUBLESHOOTING INCLUDED: 
·1 INSPECTION OF WI RING 
• MEGGER TESTS ON GSE WIRING 
• C&W MATRIX ON PANEL 2 REMOVED AND TESTED 
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FRRID 11102.1404 (CON'T) 
CREW ALERT LIGHT ANOMALY 
• CAPAC ITOR BOARD FROM C34-695 GSE UN IT REMOVED AND TESTED 
• NO ANOMALY OR DISCREPANCY COULD BE FOUND 
• ACTION TO PREVENT RECURRENCE 
• INVOLVED WIRING WAS REMOVED FROM SPACECRAFT 
• PANEL 2 MATR IX HAS BEEN REPLACED 
I 
• CDU CREW ALERT CHANNEL DISABLED TO PRECLUDE NUISANCE MASTER 
ALARMS DUETO SPURIOUS VOLTAGE PICKUP 
CONCLUS ION: 
• ANOMALY CANNOT RECUR IN FLIGHT DUE TO REMOVAL OF WIRING 
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D. Greenly/K.E.S. 5/20/75 
1I£'[It(""C£DO("lI"'[OflATIOO<o ~ .. .., .. ~ 
JDR 030 vs TCp·K-{J{J70, IJR S/C-l11-SC-0070 V36-440001 
.-- .. -
. - --
,",,,.~_JCrew ..Alert) Light (lMe~lained Anomaly) 
Caution and warning matru light "crew alert" came on durh'g camined systems 
testing on 10/31/74 - C&W system was powered-down at the time of the anomaly. 
It was later pustulated that the -condition was causoo by an intermittent short 
circuit in the SIC or GSE electrical syste:tS; however, trrubleshooting failed 
to positively yerlfy this conclusion. 
II't:Ca.-["'CXD AC1"II)tovJU'STW'I(.ATIl>o 
Submitted for information only. 
"CC)WICJtiOR)~ 
None. 
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FLIGHT READINESS REVIEI ITEM DISPOSITION (FRRIO) 
Coolraclo,', ReYle. Ileo. Resolul'on Sheel 
I rJ.-"I'" "'tr 
U,W (Crew Alert) Light (Unexplained .-\nomalYI 
.. , '.',1 "I' .. ,,,~ 'I ~.. 'oJ Ilr • A., .. I L· ... c,,", I ..... rIO ... ;;"", ...... q ... ,. '31 
Ttl(~ "Crew Alert" light in the Panel 2 C~\.o.: matrix had been dpoctivated 
by cutting and stowing the ground return wire • 
Ifowevpr. the "Crew Alert" light ""'·as reported on durin9 c~w status 
following CtW system activation on 10-31-74. Prior to this time, C&W 
was powered down becfolse tne C~ ""·as cleared for pressure operations. 
AlthouCJh th~ light had been covered with Cr. blank decal. one corner of 
the decal was inad\'~rtentl}' turned up exposing a small ar('"a of the light. 
After consulting with the sea lnvolved, on 11-1-74, an tOR was initiated 
on 11-5-74. The ars tape wa~ monitored on 11-4 and it indicated that 
the identification of the light being on was very po,itive. 
In1 tiai troubleshooting consisted of moni toring the C('W system periodicall)J 
to determine if the ljght would agajn illuminate. The light did not 
illuminate again. Therefore. the nature of the problem was one of an 
intermittent ground either in the SC or the C34-b95 GSE (includin9 
cabling to the C34-b95). 
The cabling to the GSE was Megger checked and showed no shorts. The crew 
alert circuit was functionally che~ked by applyin9 a 9round on the line 
90in9 to the C34-b95. During this procedure, the SC and rJ.", C34-b95 GSE 
performed satisfactorily. indicatin9 that the intermittent short, if it 
was in the SC or GSE electronics, did not permanently affect the 
electronic components involved. 
SC panels were removed and the wire and wire harness involved in the 
circuit from Panel 2 over to the GSE breakout cable was inspected. 
This was accomplished on TPS SC 111-SC-D29. Additionally, the PanelS 
and Panel 3 area was inspected (after Panel 3, 4, 5, b, and Ib removal) 
throu9hout the wire run from the origin of the crew alert li9ht ~urce 
(Panel 230) over to the caution and warning detection unit. No evidence 
of damage to the wiring was found anywhere in the circuit. 7he crew 
alert wire was then terminated at the caution and warning dft~tion 
unit on TPS SC 111-SC-025. This re~ved the wire connected to the crew 
alert light contact. 
Since no source of the prObI~ could be found in the SC ~r1n9 or GSE 
cables, it was decided to remove the C&W matrix assy frOD Panel 2 for 
analysis. Additionally, the event card in the C34-b95 GSE was removed 
for analysis. No discrepancies were found in either the GSE event card 
or th~ C&W matrix assy. 
Finally, ~hE C&W crew alert channel into the C&W detection unit was 
connected ~o VGP on TPS SC 111-SC-032 to preclude any possible master 
alarms due to s~ray voltage pickup_ 
"ur"'OIl'l(O ""I. 1(".,S!lIOIrAqy[ 
Original Si9ned by: R. H. Buch n/30/75 
wsc rORN 208ge (AUG 67J 
NQA-".C 










































PANEL I DET ABORT RESET ANOMALY 
ANOMALY: 
• DURING IN ITIAL RETEST AFTER REINSTALLATION OF PANEL I, THE DET FAILED TO RESET 
WHEN AN ABORT S IGNAt WAS IN ITlATED 
DISCUSS ION: 
• THE DET HAD OPERATED NORMALLY FOR TWO PREVIOUS LIFT-OFF SIGNALS 
• TIMER FA ILED TO RESET AS REQU I RED WHEN ABORT A SIGNAL ONLY WAS SENT -
GSE IND ICATE PROPER CLOSURE OF MESC RELAY CONTACTS 
• NORMALLY REDUNDANT ABORT SIGNALS (A & B) ARE SENT IN FLIGHT 
• ABORT B SIGNAL SENT - TIMER RESET 
• ABORT A SIGNAL REPEATED - TIMER RESET 
• ANOMALY NEVER REPEATED 
• TROUBLESHOOTING INCLUDED 10 CYCLES ON ABORT A AND 10 ON ABORT B 
• CONNECTOR ON PANEL I FOUND COCKED 
It BENCH TESTS ON S 1M ILAR CONNECTOR VER IF lED OVER 3/32 CONTACT ENGAGEMENT 
• CONNECTOR DEMATED AND INSPECTED 
• TESTS VERIFIED PINS AND SOCKETS DID NOT RECESS ON MATING 
• DET REMOVED AND REPLACED 
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Rockwellinternuuonal 
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FRR I Dill. 2.14. 5 (CON'T) 
PANEL I DET ABORT RESET ANOMALY 
• SYSTEM ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT 
• A VER I FlED TIMER HAS BEEN INSTALLED 
• ANOMALY OCCURRED ONLY ONCE ON ONE SYSTEM 
• REDUNDANT SIGNALS ARE SENT 
• UN IT HAS PASSED VEH ICLE RETEST 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
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__ ... __ ~~~~l ~ ~!:J Fa~led to Pe-set (lJnexplaiIled Anornal,)·.:i ___ _ 
Durin~ Par.e-! ~ rE.>tf~5t (AI ,>-1)-75, the- OfT failed to reset on ... tlme "-'hen an 
Abort A co:-:~~n'.! \<0,"':'0:. ~'~nt. froI'l th~ '-!ESC. SUbsequent COfll.:iiands r~'sultPd in 
satisfact.~r/ res~t. Inv~~tlgat1~~ r&veoled a harnpss to Panpl ~ conn~ctor 
cocked 3pproxinatc.jy (.,.(J4rJ antj lrt_rotJ(o'rly torqued. Th~ panpj .... "c., r~r..o'..·ed. 
and the DET ""35 r~nov€'d and repla~~d. 
IiP'(C~""OC:.O .. cr-oo.."I".'\ ...... or.~ .. -o-t _ Submi t ted for information only. 
FLIGHT READINESS REYIEI ITEM DISPOSITION (FRRIO) 
Contraclor's R"rI!. lam Resolution She!! 
,.- CSM III T' ". Electrical Power I '."'~.-~:r. ':·~1.'2·.'~:.5 
'·'·''"~'''H. Buch/SO I r·· ,.-r 1>-2-75 
.. I r[. r "Ct : ~ ... ,"~ ... ~ •• ! -; ... 
'.O_Ltv "'.L' 
Pan~l 1 OET Failed to Reset (Vnexp1ain~d Anomaly) 
WCStll"".'·''''.' -, ... ... - ..... ·l' •• , .... , ...... f ........... r ••• 'O'QII. ' .. d 
Pan~l I ha~ been r~moved to replace the altitude set panel. 
Ouring init1al retest after reinstallation of Panel 1, the OET 
failed tv reset as required when an abort si9nal from the ~ESC 
Logi~ r,lrr.:Jit A Was initiated. The reported discrepancy was 
nev~r ~upllcated or isolated. 
Previouily in the test sequence, the timer had reset as required 
with in.tiation of the Lift-Off si9nal on two separate occasions. 
An abort si9nal from the MESC Logic C~rcuit A was enabled; however, 
the tim2r failed to reset as required but instead continued to count. 
Verifir.ition ~hat the MESC had operated properly and sent the signal 
waS obt.!inpd from the GSE Event Lamp for Measurement C()()Q44X. An 
abort s19na1 from the MESC Logic Circuit B was sent and the ti~er 
functionpd pro~rly (reset and counted up). The abort A signal was 
then repeated and the timer f'unctioncr;'d properly. Therefore, ,the I 
timer fai led to operate properl~ .. only once and this when only an 
abort A siQnal was sent (redundant signals A & B are sent in flight). 
.... '" 
'8)" iI ,. j(ryi ...... ?t'·',.i*' fir" ?!f~~ ____ ~_~" ____ "",.--...d""''''''''_ 
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l;o:\n,,1 1 DET Failed to Reset (Unexpla.inpd Ar,('.raaly) 
'!roubleshootin<;,; included timer operation '.t;lt:' 10 cyrlps c: abort A 
ThE' tir<('Ir funl""til)n,-~d propprly each time. ctnn:>lc ::..nrl In nf ~hnrt. B. 
torqupd 1~5 turn~ (~.05 inch) ar.~ ~~p .25 turns. Bench tests on 
a SImilar connpctor 5ho~pd over .09 ;nc~~~ of contact engagement with 
this condition. 
The Panel 1 connector ~as demated and lnspected for ~vidence of 
dama~e. None ~as found. Tests verified that the pins and sockets 
in both connec~or halves were firmly seated and did not rpcp~s on 
mating. No oth~r discrepancies were noted. 
Since no discrepancy or explanation for the anomaly could be found, 
~he timer was removed from Panel 1 and another timer installed. 
The timer currently installed passed a functional test prior to 
inst3l1ation and will be ~ested in the vehicle. 
1he timer is Criticality III. The failure of the timer to reset with 
the initiation of an abort signal has no slgnificant effect on the 
mission.. The timer is normally operating In a countdown mode durin9 
prelaunch and is then reset to all zeros and counts up when a lift-off 
signal is received. The initiation of an abor~ provides an overridino 
command to the ti~er to reset to all zeros and count up. Should a 
lift-off and an abort 5i9nal be received very close tOQether, it is 
possible that the crew would not detect which Si9n&1 reset the timer. 
However, the crew would probably detect the resettino ot the timer if 
an abort si9nal was initiated some time after lift-off. Seven to nine 
seconds after LES motor fire or three seconds after canard deploy the 
crew is to actuate an ELS switch. If this switch is actuated ~arly 
(which is most probable if the timer has !e,il~d to r~s~t) th~re is no 
effect unless there is a failure 1n the EL51. Ground communication 
will also provide crew assistance 10 pacinQ their actions. 
Th2' timer system is considered acceptable for flight • 
This is based on: 
1. The timer currently installed tl&S passed a functional test. 
2. The timer will be verifu?d afh'r installation in the vehicle. 
3. Vehicle .... 5 ring ha.s ~rlorl:I;"d scltisfactorily durin9 all 
subsequent ·~~t~n9. 
4. The anomaly occurred cnly once on one '> t'"Q (Abort A). 
Redundant abort signals are seI't in fli9h~ 
.o.yh.O •• :[0 ..... ~ .(".{~' "T ."1 vI OAt( 
Ori9inal Si9T'ed by: R. H. Buch f>--2-75 
.. ;.. ,'If 
@~' 
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FRR 10 114.4.34.4 
LOST AND FOUND 
• THERE HAS BEEN NO LOST HARDWARE .fo\ T KSC 
• THERE HAVE BEEN FOUR ITEMS (3 WASHERS AND I SCREW) FOUND 
I N THE SPACECRAFT AT KSC. A PROBABLE SOURCE FOR THESE 
ITEMS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
41~ Space Division .,.~ Rockwell International 
~. 
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fL I GH T REAOINE~. REVlf. ITEM OISPOSITIO~ (fRRIO) 
C.onlra:IO,·S Revlea lien Re5CIU~!:l~ .i:::!e:: 
. " I' Los t and Found j- , ':3: -. ~ 111 .... j .. ,,':' 
:. !-!e .. ~orn r'" S}I. 05-22-75 
~;'s 0D67 ana OOb~ 
~ost and Found Harduare 
-.. , .. l~" r '0' , ., •• , I "I' ,,,,,,, ... ,. 
;j:: :'A:E I Tl,'" ru::':ARr:' 
SC-Ou6: 11-2u-74 ~o5h ... rs fount! tr.1.;'t"t':; l!'"'. :d~·:t:e!.. .:~d(>r scuff ~ 
LD153-0014-0011 shield ir. :.. ... .:~. c: i' ... :-.t=:~. All in-
1.0153-0014-0012 stallations .:-n tre- sr-3ce.-raft 
requirinb this ;.ar':..:ari: \..·~re examined 
and none fOU;1d t'.issin~. £xa:::inat ion ~ 
of pre-installati0n Photo 2031-08 I- ' 
Il1/c. I .-22/P~L "3 she"s washers ... 
identical to those found (one 
alodined and one bright) being .used 
tD mount the panel to the handling 
fixture prior to installation in :he 
spacecraft. This is bellevorl to be 
the orJgin of these washers. 
SC-0099 1-2-75 Screw Found laying on C281Al()l. coax 
NASllOOCE3-8 connector. Lack of mark. and .cuffe 
, Washer on the screw thread and washer 
1.0153-000:£-2203 indicated the items had never b~en 
installed. Since the hardware t. 
common to cable and line clamp 
installation .. , an examination of all 
acces.ible clamp. were made and none 
were found mt8sing. Total time 
expended on aearch v •• one hour_ 
-." 
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FRRID 111.5.23.3 
GSE (CI4-626) ELECTR1CAL POWER SUPPLY 
PROBLEM: 
• UNIT FAILED TO COME ON IN RESPONSE TO AC START SIGNAL FROM ACE CONTROL ROOM 
PROBLEM RECURRED FOR TEN ATTEMPTS TO START (UNEXPLAINED ANOMALY) 
• ON THE ELEVENTH COMMAND (APPROX. 24 MINUTES LATER) THE UNIT REACTED PROPERLY 
AND PROBLEM HAS NOT BEEN DUPLICATED SINCE 
TROUBLESH OOT ING: 
• COMMAND DI D GET TO LC39 AND AT LEAST AS FAR AS THE C14-481 
• FACILITY POWER CIRCUITRY WAS NOT AT FAULT 
• NO INTERMITTENT CIRCUITRY COULD BE FOUND IN CABLING AND PATCHING 
ASSOCIATED WITH THE START COMMAND 
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FRR I D III. 5. 23. 3 (CON IT) 
GSE (CI4-626) ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY 
CONCLUS ION: 
• PROBLEM I SOLATED TO GSE, NOT IN SC III 
• I F PROBLEM RECURS, IT I S ASSOCI ATED ONLY WITH POWER-UP SEQUENCE. 
POSSIBLE IMPACT TO LAUNCH MINIMAL SINCE FINAL POWER-UP OCCURS 
APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK PRIOR TO LAUNCH. 
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fliGHT READINESS REVIEW ITEM DISPOSITION (FRRID) 
(utl.,r's Itvi,. II.M ll.fini1i1n SII .. _ 
I "'< 
-I'''''· -I "'" .. u •• ,· ,·""o .. u .... r" CSH-lll Ground Support Equipment 5.23 111-5.23_3 
_n.TOOI I oO<.~;~; CATr D. Greenly/J.J .F. 5/22/75 
""","NCI. 1)OC~"TATIOtt " .. ", .. v-..r. 
100. 041 vs TCP-K-0005, 00. Wf-l-0041 C14-626 
-,. 
tTlTl"l[l GSE (C14-626) Electrical POl<er S!!EEly (Une~lained Ananaly) 
C14-626, Electrical Power Distribution Rack, Power Supply No.3 (P.S.t3) failed 
to start when COJ111W1ded "on" by ACE Control Roan R-start during integrated 
systems testing (TCP-0005). Troubleshootir.g failed to isolate cause of the 
subject condition. 
IIICa-cIlClEO ot.CT1OIIIV.l\M'TWlCATIOJC 
Submitted for infonnation only. 
-.--
None. 
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FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW ITEM DISPOSITION (FRRID) 
Contractor's RUle. Item ResolutlDr. Sheet 
CS~1 111 
1'''''. I"'''· ".," 
Ground Support Equipment S.~3 111_5.23.3 
5 .. Taylor 1"" 5-23-75 
.lrlll',,(( noc""" .. f"TIO .. 
LUT DR 1-0041 
"'.OIL('" TITL( 
G5E (C14-626) Electrical Power Supply (Unexplained Ano~aly) 
.(:!oOLu1IO"'."'IO" 10 .( , •• ( .. " •• 'O .. ,tn ... , ...... " .... , •• _ ,rq ... , .. dJ 
Initial discrepancy occurred at 08:58:31 E on 4-7-75 during power-up 
for TCP K-OOOS .. At this tiMe, th~ AC start command for Po~er Supply 
No. 3 was ex(!-cuted from the ACE Control Room. The powl"r supply 
failed to come on. 
Immediate troubleshooting disclosed that signal did get to LC39 at 
~east as far as to energize 'the fan circuits in the Cl4-48l. 
A facility power switching action had occurred in the same time frame 
but was verified to hav~ been completed approximately 20 minutes bef"ore 
the an~aly. 
The AC start circuitry was instrumented with VC»oIls and was monitored from 
4-10-75 thru 4-21-75 during all siC power-up exercised. The discrepancy 
did not repeat • 
Addi t.ional troubleshooting investigated all cabling and patches in the 
suspect circuitry but disclosed no interaittent operation. 
Circuit review and troubleshooting data indicate t.he following: 
1. The problem is definitely isolated to GSE and is in no 
way associated with SC III wiring or equipment.. 
2. The problem if it recurs is associat.ed only with power-up 
sequence. Once the systea is ac·tivated, possible impact to 
launch is negligible since tinal power-up occurs approxiaately 
one week before launch. 
3_ Most probable cause is contact fila on relay{s) A3K3, A3KS, 
A3K8 in the C14-481. 
I 
I aUTHO."(O .. ,," ."'.[Stlll1"TIY( raT' Original Signed by: S. Taylor 5-30-75 
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FRRID 111.5.23.4 
GSE (SI4-121) WIG REFRIGERATION UNIT 
PROBLEM: 
• S14-121 REFR IGERAT ION UN IT PRESSURE CYCLING BETWEEN 150 TO 200 PS IG 
• AFTER PURG ING THE REGULATOR THE PROBLEM COULD NOT BE DUPLICATED 
(uNEXPLAINED ANOMALY) 
TROUBLESHOOT ING: 
• PROBLEM ISOLATED TO REGULATOR (R4) ON S14-121 
• AFTER MON ITORING REGULATOR FOR THREE WEEKS REGULATOR CYCLING HAD NOT RECURRED 
DISCUSS ION: 
• IF REGULATOR CYCLING RECURS, DOWNSTREAM REGULATORS WILL MAINTAIN 
PROPER SYSTEM PRESSURES 
• SYSTEM IS PROTECTED WITH A RELIEF VALVE 
- CONCLUS ION: 
• PROBLEM ISOLATED TO GSE 
• MOST PROBABLE CAUSE WAS CONTAMINATION ON REGULATOR SEATS 
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FRRID 11105029.1 
SPARE FIRE EXTINGUISHERS 
PROBLEM: 
• LACK OF LAUNCH READY SPARE FIRE EXTINGUISHER FOR CSM III1DM-2 
DISCUSSION: 
• INSTALLATION/SPARE REQU IREMENTS 
v CM UNIT IS INSTALLED 48 HR PRIOR TO LAUNCH 
• THE DM UNIT IS INSTALLED 48 HR PRIOR TO DM CLOSEOUT; I.E., DM STOW 
FOR LAUNCH 6-24-75 
• CHARGED SPARES ARE NOT AVAILABLE AT KSC IF DAMAGE OCCURS TO THE 
FIRE EXTINGUISHER DURING THE TRANSFER TO THE PAD OR DURING INSTALLATION 
• CSM 118 DID NOT HAVE BACKUP UNIT PROVIDED AT KSC 
• DM SPARE 
• TWO UNCHARGED SPARES ARE AVAILABLE AT SWRI 
• INSTALLATION DATE (6-24-75) ALLOWS SUFF1GIENT RECYCLE TIME FOR 
CHARGE AND SHIPMENT OF SPARE UNIT FROM SWRI TO KSC 
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FRRID 1110502901 (CONIT) 
SPARE FIRE EXTINGUISHERS 
--- ~.-. ~,., ..... -, 
.:~:':- --.:-
. -' 











• ONE UNCHARGED SPARE AVA ILABLE AT SWR I (ASS IGNED TO CSM 119) 
(LAST CSM UN IT IN INVENTORY) 
• INSUFFICIENT RECYCLE TIME FOR CHARGE AND SHIPMENT DUE TO 
INSTALLATION SCHEDULE 
CHARGED CSM 119 LlGHTN ING TEST UN IT PRESENTLY AT KSC 
• AGE LIFE EXPIRES 7-22-75 AT ONE YEAR 
• SWR I/NASA TEST DATA SHOWS ADEQUATE FOAM VOLUME/DENS ITY 
AFTER SHAKING INDICATING EMULSION RESTORATION 
• INFLIGHT TEST DATA (SL-OWS EXTINGUISHER) SHOWS THAT MISSION 
STORAGE UNDER ZERO G DOES NOT DISRUPT EMULS IFICATION 
North American 
Space Operations 
~l~ Space Division p.~ Rockwell International 117 
~ 
J 
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FRRID 1110502901 (CON'T) 








• DM SPARE NOT REQUIRED AT KSC 
• SUFFIC lENT RECYCLE TIME FOR CHARGE AND SH I PMENT OF 
S PARE UN IT FROM SWR I TO KSC 
• CSM III SPARE 
• UTILIZE CSM 119 L1GHTN ING TEST UN IT FOR JULY LAUNCH 
OPPORTUN ITIES (JULY 15-19) BASED ON: 
• SHORT EXTENS ION OF AGE LIFE (AFTER LAUNCH) 
• TEST DATA SHOWS: 
• ADEQUATE FOAM DENS ITY AND VOLUME AFTER SHAKING 
(SPEC REQUIREMENT TO SHAKE WITHIN 48 HR OF LAUNCH) 
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I fLIGHT READINESS REVIEW ITEM-DISPOSITioN [iRRID)'- ··----l c.,.t" .. ,", Ini •• It,,,, D.finition Shut 
! '~t/~1 I''''~"ir'' f:xti:~~:Sh"~--" -I7.;,,;~~;,·, 111.5.29.1 
5/22/75 
o. Li~~:Y~J~C------ - '-TO;:"';;~'~;~ty 
.", ..... C[OOCU .. ("I1ATIO'II -.-------------- -+1 :: ..:::-:==------1 
... no Lack of Launch Ready Spare Fire Extin):uishers 
!'r'~5ent infol11lation mdicates that the t;.'O extinguIshers presently on order for 
charging will satisfy flight rcquircme~ts. with no spares. 
!-UTE: Age life for existiruz "old" fire extinguisher (1 total) 
expir~s on July 22, 19-5. 
"C~,,"Dl:D~To. lUtTIPICAT1000 
Provide flight spares (-0005/-0006) 
IICCc-...:NOlO CONS"" ..... " 
Launch closeout. 
,... _ItO COMMt:"'''' ...... _. Ot'tCC'TIOOo O·II!." ..... 
_IfOCOM>ol("TSlItt:.., .. _S.~C'T>OO'o 
JI.C'TII)N ":OU-ED TO CLo'n "-.0 
o .,,'.1111 .. 1' 
',..-....s.-,., 
DlClSION SU •• 'll (To bee rUled in h" lhe Board or Pre.BoardJ 
o ACIt •• ::J C"'tlt"t o uu o ........ 0 
.. """ .. 0 ("11,.1." 0 
." 
0 •. o •.•• u .. , "II', 0 o .... 61." 1(1,,: 0 o III'" .u.n It, 0 




fLIGHT READINESS REVIEW ITEM OISPOSITIDN IfRRID; 
CfJntraclCT'') Rene_ "fOr't ~PS[l:lJllc:n Shee: 
: ill k of I aunr:-h Up;:\dy c.;pa.re Fir" rxtlngui'lI4'fS 
.. ,," •• , ',' 101 ••• _. T •• O' ••• n' ...... ' .... • fo ... , • •• , .. ., •• ,._ .•• 
Pn~sently two fliQht f1re ('xtinguishpr~ (nnr \,:,ch for OM and C'M, arc at 
Ksr in support of thr AST{' Mi ssion ... 
Ihf> C5~t fire extingui~hpr is in~tallec1 in tl .... "pncpcra!t 4R hours prior 
to launch and thp- D~ (>xtingulshpT 48 houre-. t'Tlor to 0"'1 clospout, i.e., OM 
$tow for !~unc-h. No "r.au~ h,ivP bepn ac;c;ignrtl fa support the A!>TP Mission 
in tllP event damag(' oc-C'ure,. to the fll<Jht P);tlntlUlsherc; during transfpr 
to the Pad or during inc;-;:alJation in th~ e-.p'l('rcraft. 
SparE's have b(>,-,n availabl~ at KSC on pr~\'l(ll'':'' mis!!'iomb(>cau!>(1 the 
aSSE'ts of th~ next spac(>craft 1n line ... upport(Od as a backup. It 
should be noted. how,"vpr, that ';pacE'craft llR did not havp i:r. backup 
fire extinguisher duE' to the nature ~f tt~ (~~ 119 mission, ~hlCh was 
rescue, and charging of thp unit was witt:helc1 ppnding identifi~i\tion of 
a rescue mission. 
Wi th respect to a OM spare, th("re are pre'sf'ntly two uncharged uni ts at 
Southwest Research Institut.,. (~I\·Rl). The installation schedule for the 
OM fire extinguisher (6-24-75) allows 5ufficif'nt recycle tim~ for charoe 
and shipment of a spare unit from ~WRI to KSC in the event damage should 
occur. Charge and shipmpnt tim'" would b(> approximatf"ly five days. Based 
on this turnaround time, a spare is not n .. qui r£'d at KSC for DM-2. 
~ith ~espect to a CM spare, only one uncharQPd unit is left in the inven-
tory at SWRI. Due to the installation scheduh. of tile CM unit, 5uff"icier.t 
recycle time is not available to charge and ship an extinguisher from 
SWRI to KSC. 
A second charged CM unit is presently at KSC. That extinguisher was 
charged to support thp CSM 119 lightning ":('st and has a birth date of 
7-22-74. Due to extinguisher age life of one year. the unit's service 
life will expire prior to completion of the mission. 
Er'!ulsion stability is the major criterion in establishing extinguisher 
age life at one year. S\o:RI and NASA test data have shown that, a.fter 
shaking.adequat.- f"oart density and volum~ l,,",pre pvident for,.post f"light and 
extended shelf aged units,indicating emul,!;ion stability. S\\RI test data 
also indicat~s that mission storage under 7.ero G does not deQrade emul~ion 
stabi]:i ty to the Il>x'tent wncou.ntered in on_,' G. 
To support the ShORT test. data int".li9ht te!ltinQ of the Skylab OWS 
extinguisher established that the el:!l.ulsification WAS not distributed. 
Bnsed on the short extension of aQe life '!lOd prelaunch shake requirement 
to restore emUlsification, plus the fact 'I:hat the aQe lif"e of the IlQ 
extinguishrr expires in zero Qravity for i!1 July ASTP Mission, it is 
recommended that the CSM 119 fire extinguJ sher be allocated 1;0 CSM III 
as a backup unit. 
.U'''O.IIU_'~~S~ .. t.'f\l( 
_CU. t· +I~ ... ~ T'~-~-15' 
"5{ FOA .. 20aga 'AUG 671 1 HUA._M.C 
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• OPEN PROGRAM FAILURES & UNSATISFACTORY COND ITiONS - ONE NEW ITEM 
• OPEN LAUNCH IMPACT GSE PROBLEMS - NONE 
• LIMITED LIFE SUMMARY - NO OPEN ISSUES 
• REUSE HARDWARE SUMMARY - 209 ITEMS 
• CR ITICAL S INGLE FA ILURE POINT SUMMARY - 2 NEW ITEMS 
• CERTIFICATION STATUS - COMPLETE 
• STRESS CORROSION SURVEY - COMPLETE 
• CONTRACTOR SAFETY ASSESSMENT - FLIGHT READY 
, ... 
_____ :' .. __ -'~;;lC"~"--
-i.'"tI. ~ 
• OPERATIONAL DATA BOOK, HANDBOOK & FLIGHT DATA FILE STATUS - ON SCHEDULE 
• ICD/SCN STATUS - COMPLETE 
• WAIVER/DEVIATION SUMMARY - 5 WAIVERS 
• TRSD WA IVER SUMMARY - 13 WA IVERS 
• LAUNCH CRITICAL SPARES SUMMARY - ON SITE 
North American 
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• OPEN PROBLEMS APPLICABLE TO ASTP -1 
• FA ILURES OCCURR I NG ON ASTP -1 
• OPEN SIGNIFICANT UNSATISFACTORY CONDITION PROBLEMS - 0 
North American 
Space Operations 
.4j~ Space Division ".~ Rockwell International 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
OPEN LAUNCH IMPACT GSE PROBLEMS 
THERE ARE NO OPEN 
LAUNCH IMPACT GSE PROBLEMS 
North American 
Space Operations 
.41~ Space Division p.~ Rockwell International 
~ II ~ ,. 
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ASTP CSM Iii FRR 
LIMITED LIFE SUMMARY 
" .... .J 
" 
- i 







MA0201-5695 - AGE L I FE 
NO AGE CONTROLLED I TIME ACTION ITEMS EXCEED SPEC REQ'MTS 
ALL ACTIVITIES COMPLETED 
MA0201-0077 - OPERATING TIME/CY£:LE 
NO TIME OR CYCLE LIMITED ITEMS EXCEED SPEC REQUIREMENTS 
THRU MISS ION COMPLETION 
North American 
Aerospace Group 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
AGE CONFIDENCE 
• CSM III HARDWARE AGE IS WITH IN ALAS STUDY LIM ITS - 10 YRS OR PER SPEC 
• ASTP UNIQUE HARDWARE IS WITHIN DESIGN CRITERIA - 5 YRS OR PER SPEC 








ELECTRON I C BOXES 
CHLORINE/BUFFER AMPULES 
FECAL COLLECTORS 
LIM IT ING ITEM 
PACK LIFE 












15 NlO OR MORE (SLA 8 MO) 
PRELAUNCH CHARGE 
10MO 
8 MO OR MORE 
PRELAUNCH CHARGE 
8MO 
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41~ Space Division p.~ Rockwell International 
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AGE LI FE Ai~ALYS I S 
ALL NON-METALLICS & MOVING MET.ALLIC MATERIALS 
• AGE LI FE ANAL YS I S CON S I DERED 
• MATERIALS INVOLVED 
• FUNCTI ON OF PART 
• ENV IRONMENT 
• STRESS / LOAD 
• CRITICALITY K FAILURE MODE 
• FAI LURE HI STORY 
AGE LI FE SUBSTANTIATING DATA FROM: 
• I NDUSTRY USAGE !TESTS 
.. CHEMICAL COMPOSITION 
• SD & JSC CONDUCTED TESTS ON NATURALLY AGED 
PARTS & ON ACCELERATED AGED PARTS 
RESULTS 
C,:' 
• ANALYSI S COMPLETED ON APOLLO / SKYLAB PARTS 
OVER THREE YEARS OLD 
• PARTS WITH AGE LI FE < 10 YEARS SPEC CONTROLLED 
• REDUCED QUANTITY OF AGE-CONTROLLED PARTS 
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STRUCTURE 
MECHANICAL 
ENV I RONMENTAL CONTROL 
REACTION CONTROL 
IN STRUMENTAT ION 
ELECTR I CAL POWER 
STAB ILiZATION CONTROL 
COMMUNICATIONS 
CREW EQU I PMENT 
DIS PLAY ICONTROLS 
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FLIGHT HARDWARE REUSE PROGRAM 
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' wsw' " i... ...... . . 'bo ... ... , "' -.,~,- ... -". 
• ELECTR I CAL / ELECTRON I C COM PONENTS 
• PHYSICAL INSPECTION 
- NON-ENVI RONMENTAL FUNCTIONAL 
• MECHANI SMS 
- INS PECTI ON 
• CLEANING 
- REPLACEMENTS - IF REQUI RED 
- FUNCTIONAL 
-STATIC 
-INSPECTION (X-RAY, DYE PEN, ETC) 
• RE-PROOF - IF APPLI CABLE 
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FORM 3"16·E REV. 2·70 
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SPACE I >IYISJ();\; 
NDRTH AMERICAN ROC,,-\\'E!.!. CORPOR,\'I IO;\; 
SUMMARY 






MEZ84- 0147 -0071 
ME284-0147 -0071 
ME284-0147 - 0071 








~··I ~" ..,~ 
Serial Number Nomenclature 
Ob3594580BBA Relay Assembly 
063594581 BBA Relay Assembly 
063594844BBA Relay Assembly 





004000048107 Metering Valve 
00400007818Z Valve 
004000036114 Valve 
103 OZ OOOOOOZ Valve 
1030Z0000003 Valve' 
103 OZ 00000Z2 Valve 
103020000041 Valve 
Page 1 of 14 
DATE '1- '1- 75 
SECTION 40 
System CSM Flown 
3. 08 i 12 
3.08 ill 
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SPACE J)JVISIO:-'; -l 
NORTE} AMERICAN ROC'" WELL CORPOR YI'IO;-"; 
SUMMARY Page 2 of14 
DATE -.2...::5-75 
CSM 111 REUSE FLIGHT lIARDWARE LIST SECTION 40 
. ' 
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NORTH AMERICAN ROC!\. \,"ELI. CORPORATIO:'\ 
SUMMARY Page 3 of 14 
DATE~5-75 
CSM III REUSE FLIGHT HARDWARE LIST SEC'TlON 40 
-; I 
Item HRE ASHUR PaL"t Number Serial Number Nomenclature System CSM Flown 
30. NR1896 113545 ~E452-0102-4101 057750016855 Switch, Toggle 2.14 117 ~ 
.. I 31. NR1898 113545 ~.lE452-01 02-4101 057750035869 Switch, Toggle 2.14 117 
32. NR1895 113545 ME452-0l 02-41 01 057759272765 Switch, Toggle 2.14 117 
33, NH 1 H99 1(31)41) M 1';'1'jl-llIOl_41 0 I O'i Ti'; 00 \1, HH (, Swlll'h, '1'11101101111 2,14 117 
34. NR1902 113545 ~1E452-01 02-4101 057750262933 Switch, Toggle 2.14 117 
35, NR1894 113545 ~E452-01 02-4101 057759153745 Switch, Toggle 2.14 117 
36. NR1903 113545 l.1E452- 01 02-41 0 1 057759098713 Switch, Toggle 2.14 117 
37. NR1927 113545 ~E452-01 02-4101 057750016863 Switch, Toggle 2.14 117 
38. NRl905 113545 ME452-0102-4201 057759297057 Switch, Toggle 2.14 117 
39. NR1784 113545 ~E4'52-01 02-5101 05775001&861 Switch, Toggle 2.14 112 
40. NR1786 113545 ME452-0102-5101 057759272775 Switch, Toggle Z.14 112 
~ 
41. r-,'RI789 113545 ~E452-0102-5201 057759298102 Switch, Toggle 2. 14 113 
42. NR1783 113545 ME452-01 02-51 01 057750016846 Switch 8.14 113 
, 1 
• 43. NR1781 113545 ~E452-0102-5101 057750016822 Switch 8.14 113 
-, 
. ~ 
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~()RTJI AMERICAN IU)C" WELL CORPORA'II()\' 
SUMMARY Page 4 of 14 
DATE --2=5-75 
CSM 111 REUSE FLIGHT HARDWARE LIST SECTION 40 
i 
Item HRE ASHUR Part Number 
, 
Serial Number Nomenclature System CSM Flown 
,~ 44. NR1782 113545 ME452-0102-5101 057750016838 Switch .8. 14 
113 
45. NR1785 113545 ME452-0102-5101 05775
0016862 Switch 8.14 112 
46. NR1780 113545 ME452-0102-5101 05775001
6810 Switch 8.14 112 
·n. NR1946 116525 ME455-0005-0034 0
13980000010 Relay 2.14 117 
48. NR1945 116525 ME455-0005-0034 01398000
0013 Relay 2. 14 116 
49. NR1944 116525 ME455-0005-0034 01398000
0004 Relay 2. 14 117 
50. NR1639 112134 ME478-0067 -0014 07136803
0008 VHFI AM Equipment 2.11 113 
51. NRl724 112551 ME49Z-0010-003l 00400004614
3 Fan 8.05 110 
52. NR2132 117507 ME493- 00 1 0- 0402 10028AA
BI041 Gyro, B-MAG 2.10 113 
53. NR2134 117507 ME493-0010-0402 1 0028BA
B 1033 Gyro, B-MAG 2.10 116 
54. NR1377 110109 ME901-0706-0402 10028BA
FI017 Reaction Controller 2.10 112 
<t 
55. NR1382 100010 ST273000lMEOOOl 07380000
3925 Fitting, Dynatube 3.06 100 
56. NR1383 100010 ST2730001MEOOOI 07380
0003926 Fitting, Dynatube 3.06 100 
-I 57. NR1348 100010 ST2730D01MEOO04 07
3800003819 Fitting, Dynatube 3.06 100 




L .......... ~ ............ _ ..... _ 't, "g." ''',"' 
....... "CL'.-;:"-'--...~·~"">_..,._ ••• _ .... ,. .,--~ .•. ---... , ... "",....,._....i..""_--a£:i..~,-"." . .:...c __ ,,~~ •• ~~ ___ ~.'-~~
~ .' ••• ,~ ............. __ ~ ............... _~ .• __ •• _",~ 













" '-~- - I_"O __ ~ __ ~ _______ -____ O~ __ -_" ------
-_ T' - r /. --: ---- - - ---- -- -ceJ 
SPACE IlIVISI();-.J 
NORTH AMERICAN ROC/\. \rEI.I. CORPORATlO!\i 
SUMMARY Page 5 of 14 
DA TE -.2.::.5 - 7 5 CSM III REUSE FLIGHT HARDWARE LIST SECTlO;~ 40 
~ 
Item HRE ASHUR Part Number Serial Number Nomenclature System CSM Flown 
58. NRl350 100010 ST273000lMEOO04 073800003821 Fitting, Dynatube 3.06 100 
59. NR1351 100010 ST2730001MEOOO4 073800003822 Fitting, Dynatube 3.06 100 
60. NR1356 100010 ~T2730001MEOO08 073800003827 Fitting, Dynatube 3.06 100 
61. NR1357 100010 ST2730001MEOO08 073800003828 Fitting, Dynatube 3.06 100 
62. NRI358 100010 ~T2730001MEOO08 073800003829 Fitting, Dynatube 3.06 100 
63. NR1359 100010 f-T2730001MEOO08 073800003830 Fitting, Dynatube 3.06 100 
64. NR1674 3RC2.003 ST2840021MEOOOS 102320270013 Valve, Solenoid 3.06 100 
65. NR1675 3RC2.003 '::T284002lMEOO05 102320470023 Valve, Solenoid 3.06 100 
66. NR1676 3RC2.003 ST284002lMEOOOS 102320470030 Valve, Solenoid 3,06 100 
67. NRI677 3RC2.003 ST2840021MEOOOS 102320470033 Valve, Solenoid 3.06 100 
68. NR1829 lRC2·00l ST284002lMEOO06 102320270004 Valve, Sole-noid l,06 100 
69. T\'iH 339 lnC2.00l ~'l'2840021 MEOO06 102320270008 Val V'II. Solenoid 3.06 100 
70. KR1340 3RC2.003 ST284002lMEOO06 102320270009 Valve. Solenoid 3.06 100 
71. NR1378 3RC2.003 ST2840021MEOO06 102320470032 Valve, Solenoid 3.06 100 
r- ......; FORM nll·E REV. 2·70 
133 
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Item HRE ASHUR 
r 
72. NR1678 3RC2-003 
~ 
73. NRl717 109533 
74. NRI725 109'533 
75. NRI795 AOO 11 
76. NRl791J AOOll 
77. NR2065 110052 
78. NRl729 114514 
79. NR1857 116516 
80. NR2008 ZTV1518 
81. NRZ009 ZTV1518 
8Z. NR1798 AOOll 
'( 
83. NR1794 AOOll 
84. NRI775 110091 
" 85. NRl587 116511 
86. NR18Z6 116520 
FORM 3916·E REV. 2·70 
f'-
~ 
"~- ~~'"-~. "~ .. "~ -
- ,. , 
- T'~~"~ 
SPACE 11I\")SIO'.; 
:'-,()RTII AMER[CA~ ROC" WI·:I.I. COIU'()lt\1 I():,\' 
SUMMARY 
C;SM III REUSE FIlGIIT I[AIU)WAR~ LIST 
Part Number Serial Number N oITlenclature 
ST2840021MEOO06 102320570035 Valve, Solenoid 
'.'36-331435 06362YCC0879 Bracket 
V36-331443 063 62YCC088 t Strap 
'[36-326637 063 62 Y C C 11 60 Ring 
V36-326642 o 63 62 Y C C 1 1 69 Handle 
\' 3 6 - 42 145 7 - 11 06361A024060 Cable, Vac. Cleaner 
V36-421649-Z1 0636ZAAJ1374 Cable 
'/36-441352-31 0636ZYCC0903 Cover 
V36-444226-81 06362YCC1387 Wire Clamp 
'/36-444280-31 06362YCC1388 Clip 
V36-553740 06362YCCl149 Guide Assembly 
V36-553759-11 0636ZYCC1l47 Ring Assembly 
"36-575101-841 06361A014178 Docking Probe 
\[36-601015-401 06362AAJ9077 Contain~rs 
"36-601Z07-71 063 62AAJ804 6 Umbilical - Oxygen 
...... 
I 
---. r" +.-.~~-.~.r .. ~ .,......_._. T-'"'-- --,.'"
"tiI'"~ 
Page 6 of 14 
DATE --2..:,')-75 
SECTION 40 
System CSM Flown 
3.06 100 
8. 13 110 
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Item HRE ASHUR 
87. NR1732 116523 
88 . NR2066 114503 
89. NRl454 114503 
90. NR1555 116500 
91. NR2077 114501 
92. NR2078 114501 
93. NR2074 114501 
94. NR2075 114501 
95. NR2076 114501 
96. NR2060 116523 
97. NR1872 110579 
98. KR1871 110579 
99 . NR2062 110578 
l'OO' 
NR1527 110571 
"ORM 3111.£ REV. 2-10 






NORTH AMERICAN ROC'" \"EI.I. CORI'OI{''\TION 
SUMMARY Page 7 of 14 
. DATE~5-75 
CSM 111 REUSE FLIGHT HARDWARE lJST SECTION 40 
Part Number Serial Number Nomenclature System CSM Flown 
'.'36-601519 063 62AAJ997 6 Hex Socket 2.13 116 
V36-601520-101 06362AAJ5416 Container 2.13 114 
'.'36-601522-101 06362AAJ5415 Contpiner 2.13 114 
V36-601596 063 62AAJ893 6 Mount - COAS 2.13 116 
lT36_ 601632-211 06362AAJ9882 Container 2.13 116 
V36-601632-211 06362AAJ9887 Contpiner 2.13 117 
','36_ 601632-211 06362AAK1395 Cont.iner 2.13 118 
V 36- 601632-211 06362AAK1396 Container 2.13 118 
'/36- 601632-211 06362AAK1397 Container 2.13 118 
V36-601400-11 06362AAH7926 Emergency Wrench 8.13 113 
V36-610041-101 06362AAH5916 Coldp1ate 3.05 117 
V3 6- 61 0041-1 01 06362AAG9510 Co1dplate 3.05 113 
(Reworked into -301) 
V36-610109-21 06362AAJ6276 Coldplate 2.05 117 
736-613305-17 06362 AAK28 65 Temp. Controller 2.05 lIZ 
1':1" 
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111. NR1840..Rl 113539 
112. NR1343 113535 
113. NR1642 108524 
FORM "11-E REV. 2·70 
--~,- 1if'...,. .. ~-- ~-'T'W""/' -
SPACE Ill\'I"I( 1'\ 
!';Olr!iI AMERICAN R( IC"-\\ 1:1.1 (OR!'( )I{:\II( 1'\ 
SUMMARY 
CSM III REUSE FLIGHT HARDWARE LIST 
Part Number Serial Number Nomenclature 
"36_715100_41 063 62AAJ497 6 CCU Head 
(Reworked to -71) 
V36-715100-41 06362AAJ3079 CCU Head 
(Reworked to -71) 
V3b-71'il04-71 OI,"iI,2AAII 1,0 H, CC\I C:.hlfl 
(Peworkctl lo -121) 
V36-715501 06362 AAK4942 Pre-Mod Processor 
V36-756146 06362AAJ6745 Camera Moant 
V36-75952Q 06362AAH9713 Current Lixniter 
"36-759533 06362AAG6182 Current Linriter 
V36-761111-861 06362 AAH5422 Panel No. 
'.'36-761117-41 06362AAJOOl6 Panel No.7 
V36-761201 06362AAH6665 Panel No.2 
'136-761203-831 06362AAH6675 Panel No.3 
V3 6-7 62290-31 06362AAJ8981 Panel No. 277 




Page 8 of 14 
DATE 5-5-75 
SECTION __ 40 __ _ 
System CSM Flown 
8.11 114 
8, 11 114 
H.ll 114 
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NORTH AMERICAN ROC'"' WELL CORPORATION 
SUMMARY 
CSM III REUSE FLIGHT HARDWARE LIST 
Part Number Serial Number Nomenclature 
" 36-784013-281 06362AAJ7200 Container 
V36-784013-321 06362AAK2716 Container 
"36-787344 06362AAJ8436 Container 
\'36-787800 06362AAJ8392 Container 
V36-787803-71 06362AAJ7172 Container 
\'36-787803-71 06362AAJ6480 Container 
V36-787806-41 06362AAJ5666 Container 
\'36-787808 06362AAJ6376 Container 
V36-787829 06362AAJ5715 Container 
\'36-787830 06362AAJ6460 Container 
(Keworked into -11) 
v52-314001-21 06362AAK4011 Hatch 
(Reworked into -31) 
V52-314001-1l 06362AAK4009 Hatch 
(P.eworked into -41) 
V52-550300-11 06362AAK2735 Control Assembly 
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Item HRE ASHUR 
127. NRZOZ6 AOO13 
128. NR2052 117526 
129. NR2016 116514 
130. NR2017 1 ',6514 
131. NR201B 116514 
132. NR2019 11 (,514 
133. NR2020 116514 
134. NR2021 116514 
135. NR2022 116514 
136. NR2023 116514 
137. NR2024 116514 
138. NR2045 119500 
139. NR1B59 116516 
'-OAM Jlll·1E AIEV.I.70 
"', .~ 
w'.' 
.. , ~~,".:..;;+ ...... ...._" , '_~~_,,'~_~, .. _o_~_.,'_, ",","-,, 
SPACE I J/\'I"I()\ 
:-.iORTII AME,dCA:>: IU)C"- \\ELL (OJ{POJ{ \ Ii( l:>: 
SUMMARY Pcoge 10 of 14 
DATE 5-5-75 
CSM III REUSE FllGHT HARDWARE llST SECTION ~4~0L-__ 
Part Number Serial Number Nomenclature Sy.tem CSM Flown 
V5Z-550300-21 06362AAK2737 Control A.sembly 8.03 113 
(F.eworked into -41) 
V52-782023-11 06362AAK1406 Locker D3 8.13 117 
(Reworked into -11) 
756-317565-5 06362YCC 134B Pin 8.01 lIB 
V56-317565-5 06362YCC1349 Pin B.01 lIB 
V56-317565-5 06362YCC1350 Pin 8.01 118 
"56-317565-7 06362YCC1351 Pin B.01 lIB 
V56-317565-7 06362 Y C C 13 5 2 Pin B.01 lIB 
Y56-317565-7 06362YCC1353 Pin 8.01 11B 
V56-317565-9 06362 YCC 1354 Pin 8.01 118 
'{56-317565-9 06362YCC1355 Pin B.01 11B 
V56-317565-9 06362YCC135b Pin 8.01 llB 
Y56-331706-501 06362AAJ9334 Locker Z.13 Mock-Up 
V56-441353 06362YCC0904 Cover Z.13 116 
138 
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Item HRE ASHUR 
140. NR1860 116516 
141. NR1861 116516 
142. NR1841 116515 
143. NR1046 11 &514 
144. NR1647 116514 
145. NR1648 116514 
146. NR1649 116S14 
147. NR1650 116514 
148. NR1651 116514 
149. NIU652 116514 
150. NR1653 116514 
151. NRZ056 116514 
152. 1'~R2057 116514 
153. NR2058 116514 
FORM 3111.£ REV. 2-70 
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SPACE I >IVISIO:'-l NORTH AMERICAN ROC"" WEl.l. C:ORPORATIO;\; 
SUMMARY 
GSM III REUSE FLIGHT HARDWARE LIST 
Part Number Serial Number Nomenclature 
'156-441425 -1 06362YGG0905 Gover 
V5 6-441425-2 06362YCG0906 Gover 
'.TS 6-4422 60 063 62AAJ535 0 SGS J -Box 
V5CJ-53Z001-11 o ()3lJ2 YCC0909 Lat.ch Assembly 
V5 6-532001-11 06362YGG0910 Latch Assembly 
V56-532001-11 0636ZYGG0911 Latch Assembly 
V56.S32001.11 06362 YCC0934 Latch Assembly 
1'S 6-S32001.11 06362YGC0935 Latch Assembly 
V56-532001.11 06362YCG0936 Latch Assembly 
V56-53Z001-11 06362YGG0940 Latch Assembly 
V56-532001.11 06362YGG0965 Latch Assembly 
Y56-53Z001-11 0636ZYCC1357 Latch Assembly 
V56-532001-11 06362YCC1358 Latch Assembly 
\'56-532001-11 0636ZYCC1359 Latch Auembly 
Page II of 14 
DATE-2.:.5- 75 
SECTION 40 
System GSM Flown 
2. 13 116 
2. 13 116 
2.08 116 
Z.13 116 
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.of I Itefll. HRE ASHUR 
154. NR1458 114501 
155. NR2055 114501 
156. NR1884 109538 
157. NR1885 109538 
158. NR1886 1091j38 
159. NR1887 109538 
160. NR1888 109538 
161. NR1889 109538 
162. NR1890 109538 
163. NR1891 109538 
164. NR1749 116501 
~ I 165. NR2054 108524 
166. NR1880 105541 
167. NRI371 105533 
"ORM 1111-£ REV. 1·70 




0:0RTII AMERICAN ROCI--.\\'EI.I. C()RPOR:\ I If)\: 
SUI'V'MARY 
CSM III REUSE FLIGHT HARDWARE LIST 
Part Number Serial Number Nomenclature 
V56.601029 06362AAJ8082 Container 
'[56.601029 06362AAK0304 Container 
V56.601061 06362AAK0130 Strap 
'[56.601061 06362AAK0131 Strap 
V56.601061 Oll3 (l2AAKOl3Z Strap 
'156.601061 06362AAK0133 Strap 
V56.601061 06362AAK0134 Strap 
'156.601061 06362AAK0135 Strap 
V56.601061.11 06362AAK0136 Strap 
V56.601061.11 06362AAK0137 Strap 
Y56·715500.21 06362AAJ5552 Speaker Box 
V56-786573.151 063 62AAK 1145 Container 
'{57.321602 06362YCC1296 Shelf 
V57-326455 06362YCC0416 Pin 
5~' 
..... - .... 'ri" " .,1, • " ......... b.. ........ ...... .. '_~~~h~ ..... ,,, ... ,"."'", _£'-~_'_~'''''_'_'.'--''~.-.....i~""-,-,-,.-_~.,_>~,,,-..•..• "~. 94;a. ~ .. '~""" __ ."-' 





Page 12 oi 14 
DATE~5.75 
SECTION 40 
System CSW Flown 
2.13 114 I ~ 
2. 13 117 
2.13 116 
2. 13 116 
2.13 116 
2.13 116 
2. 13 116 
2. 13 116 
2.13 117 
2. l3 117 
2.11 116 
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SPACE IIIVISI()'.; 
NORTH AMERICA!\' ROC,", \\'ELL (:()J{POI{ATI()0: 
SUMMARY 
CSlv! III REUSE FLIGHT HARDWARE LIST 
Part Number Serial Number Nomenclature 
V57-326455 06362YCC0419 Pin 
\'57-326456 06362 YCC0417 Angle 
V57-32M56 o (13 (,2 Y C C 0420 Angle 
\'57-339815 06362 YCC0407 Snpport 
V57-339817 06362 YCC0408 Fitting 
\'57-339818 06362YCC0413 Fitting 
V57-339824 06362YCC0409 Fitting 
\'57-339829 06362 YCC0410 Fitting 
V57-339862 06362YCC0411 Fitting 
YS7-339866 06362YCC0412 Brace 
V57-400106-11 06362AAJ4961 PSM 
'/57-400160-41 06362AAKl729 ReS Prop. Manifold 
V57-400160-41 06362AAK1730 ReS Prop. Manifold 
'/57-400160-42 06362AAK1740 ReS Prop. Manifold 
V57-400160-42 06362AAK1741 ReS Prop. Manifold 
Page 13 of 14 
DATE 5-5-75 
SECTION _...:.4~0 __ _ 















































Item HRE ASHUR 
183. NR1488 3RCZ-00Z 
184. NR1489 3RC2-002 
185. NR1490 3RC2-002 
186. NR1372 105532 
187. NR1744 100009 
188. NR1745 100009 
189. NR1503 112555 
190. NR2067 112139 
191. NR2107 112139 
192. NR2053 112535 
193, NR1797 AOOll 
~ORM 3)ll.·E REV. 2·70 
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SPACE I )lnSI();\" 
!,)ORTH AMERICA!'l R()(h,\\"EII. C()J{POI{·\II();\" 
SUMMARY Page 14 of 14 
DATE -.2.:. 5 - 15 
CSM III REUSE FI.JGHT HARDWARE I.JST SECTION 40 
Part Number Serial Number Nomenclature SYBtem CSM Flown 
V57-460106 06362AAJ4101 Helium Tank ABBy. 3.06 100 
V57-460106 06362AAJ4102 Helium Tank ABBy. 3.06 100 
v57-460106 063 62AAJ41 03 Helium Tank ABBy. 3.06 100 
V57-460218 06362YGG0418 Support 3.18 105 
"57-470143 06362YCC0898 Clamp Set 3.06 100 
V57-470143 06362YCC0899 Clamp Set 3.06 100 
828510-5-1 004000087138 Regulator, EMG 02 8.05 112 
(ME284-03 70-0001) 
ME478-0070-0007 061418020018 S-Band 2.11 118 
ME478-0070-0009 061418020022 S-Band 2.11 117 
,[36-715501 06362 AAK4943 PMP 2.11 117 
V36-553730 06362YCC1l48 Handle Rel. Assy. 8.03 117 
142 
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SPACE 11l\'ISIO:-; 
NORTH AMERICAN R()C"-\n~J.1. C()RI'ORXllO:-; 
SUMMARY 
CSM III REUSE FLIGHT HARDWARE LIST 
(Hardware As 5 il!ne<iLInstalled After 5-5-75\ 
Item HRE ASHUR Part Number Serial Number Nomencl
ature 
ZOB. (1) 110594 V56-7B6517-61 0636ZAAJB555 Container 
Z09. (2) 117533 ME.456-0044-0003 1009BDET3036 Digital Event Timer 
(1) HRE package submitted to NASA 5-23-75 
(2) HRE package in preparation 
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Page l(1 of 16 
DATE 6-2-7 S 
SECTION --,4"",0 __ _ 
System CSM Flown 
Z. 13 116 
2. 14 lIB 
144 
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ASTP SINGLE FAILURE POINT SUMMARY 
C5M 111l5LA 18/DM 2/D5 5 
"'", 
_. -:-::~·~r"-~. 




• CRITICALITY I SFP'S ASSOCIATED WITH NEW HARDWARE (OM) 5 
2N2 TANKS ON DM 2 (BURST) ADEQUATE DESIGN 
• • •• PROOF PRESSURE CHECK 
. ",';"'. ~ 







" ' ~ 
2 02 TANKS ON DM 2 (BURST) NO INTERNAL SOURCES OF PRESSURE INCREASE 
*DOCKING TARGET (STRUCTURAL FAILURE/IMPACT WITH SIVB DOME) 
• TOTAL CRITICALITY II SFP'S 1645 
• CRITICALITY II SFP'S ASSOCIATED WITH NEW HARDWARE (oM/DS) 117 
*ECS WIG SHUT-OFF VALVE 
, 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
CRITICAL SINGLE FAILURE POINT SUMMARY (SFPS) 
.. SINCE ASTP SFPS RELEASE (BASELINE, FEB. 1974) 
• NEW CRITICALITY I 
• ONE NEW ITEM 
• DOCKING TARGET INSTALLATION ON DOCKING MODULE 
• POSSI BLE IMPACT OF TARGET ON DOME OF SIVB LH2 
PROPELLANT TANK DURING LAUNCH 
• HAZARD TO SPACECRAFT/CREW IF FI RE OR EXPLOS ION OCCURS 
• ADEQUATE STRENGTH MARGINS VERIFIED BY ANALYSIS -
FACTOR OF SAFETY IS 2.2 
• NEW CR ITI CALI TY II (CREW SAFETY) 
• ONE NEW 1 TEM 
• ECS WIG SHUT-OFF WIVERTER) VALVE OlEM 2. 36C) ADDED FOR 
ELECTROPHORESI S EXPERIMENT (MA-OI4) 




• LOSS OF WIG INTO CM 
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ASTP CSM 'II FRR 
OPEN CERTIFICATION STATUS 
ALL CERTIFICATION TESTS 
AND 
ANALYSES ARE COMP LETE 
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ASTP - CSM III FRR 
CONTRACTOR SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
~~~-.-
~~ , ~:t!!!i '-'~ . 
• ALL ACCIDENT/INCIDENTS INVESTIGATED AND CLOSED 
• SAFETY REV lEW OF TEST DOCUMENTS COMPLETED 
• ALL CSM III AND DM-2 WAIVERS CONCURRED WITH BY SAFETY 
• ALL FMEA·S CONCURRED WITH BY SAFETY 
I 
- -~ 
• CLOSEOUT CREW INCAPACITATED EGRESS TRAINING COMPLETED 
• HYPERGOLlCS, CRYOGENICS AND HI-PRESSURE GROUND 
CREW CERTIFICATION PROGRAM UP TO DATE 




41~ Space Division .,.~ Rockwell International 
,~ 
" , .... 



















'-r' '-L.~...- ,'- .'--v--~- .~~ 
ASTP CSM III FRR 
C SM SKYLAB OPERATIONAL DATA BOOK, HANDBOOK & FLIGHT DATA FILE 
SPACE DIVISION CERTIFIES THAT ALL DATA AND 
PROCEDURES NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE CSM III 
MISSION HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AND WILL BE 




41~ Space Division r.~ Rockwell International 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
ICD/SCN STATUS 
ALL CSM III ICD/IRN'S 
AND 
-~- --- ~ "...-r---
,.. 
.-' -..... ~-" ~ -.~-- ~ ... ~ '--
. .-. -- ~ -- - .~-. 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
ICD/IRN STATUS 
• I NTERCENTER 
• No HARDWARE ITEMS OPEN 
• THREE DOCUMENTATION IRN's IN WORK 
• I NTPp.CE~nER 
• ONE IRN TO UVA EXPERIMENT ICD TO 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
WAIVER/DEVIATION SUMMARY 
WA IVER NO. _SUBJECT 
CSM 0163 H2 PRESSURE SW ITCH EXCEEDED 
UPPER LIMIT ACTUATION 
PRESSURES (261 PS IA SHOULD 
BE 260 PS IA MAX) 
CSM 0246 WA IVER POWER REDUNDANCY OF 




FLIGHT DOCKING PROBE NOT 
AVAILABLE FOR TEST 
(DCS 0131) 
,_ R~MARKS/RATIONALE 
VALVE MODULE PRESSURE SWITCH 
DEMONSTRATED REPEATAB ILITY 
AT 261 PS IA FOR 10 CONSECUTIVE CYCLES. 
MEASUREMENT PERFORMS SA TI SFAC-
TORllY ON MAIN IlA'J BUS PWR, 
MEASUREMENT PROV I DES INFO ONLY I 
DOES NOT AFFECT THE FUNCTI ON OF THE 
WIG EVAPORATOR OPERATION AND IS 
NOT MANDATORY FOR FLIGHT. 
DOCKING PROBE C/O PERFORMED 
UTILIZING PROBE ASSIGNED TO CSM 119Q 
THIS TEST VERIFIED THE CM DOCKING 
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQU I REMENTS. 
North American 
Space Operations 
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WA I ~~RJ"! Q! 
DM 006 
DS 007 
I ,. .., 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
WAIVER/DEVIATION SUMMARY 
SUBJECT 
WEIGHT AND BALANCE OF 
FLIGHT CONFIGURATION DM 
" REMARKS/RATIONALE 
DS-3 UTILIZED IN PLACE OF DS-5 
DUE TO AVAILAB ILITY AND SAME 
MA S S D I ST RIB UT ION. 
DIMENSIONAL NONCONFORMANCE DIMENSIONAL/ FORCES MARGINALLY 
WITH lED 5000405 REQUIREMENTS OUT OF lED TOLERANCES DO NOT 
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ASTP CSNi III FRR 
TRSD WAIVER SUMfvlARY 









WINfEC PSM GAS CHECKOUT FILTER/ SINCE UNITS
 ARE WELDED ASSEMBLIES 
QD ASSEMBLIES REQU I RED TO BE NEW FILTERS WO
ULD BE REQUiRED. 
RECERTIFIED AFTER USE ON THREE COST WOULD 
BE EXCESS IVE FOR ONE-TIME 
SPACECRAFT, USE. ALL FILTE
R/QD ASSEMBLIES ARE 
FLUSHED AND VERIFIED CLEAN TO LEVEL I 
OF MA0610-017 AFTER EACH SIC USE. 
HYDROGEN TANK NO. I PRESSURE MAX OPERATI
NG POINT IS SPECIFIED TU 
SWITCH ACTUATION OCCURS AT MAINTAIN A M
IN 5 PSI DIFFERENTIAL 
269 PSIA. MAX OPERATING POINT WiTH MIN C&W
 TRI P POINT OF 270 PSIA. 
SHOULD BE 265 PS IA. ACTUAL C&W TR
 I P PO I NT IS 280 PS IA 
SO DIFFERENTIAL IS MAINTAINED. 
HAND HELD DM PRESSURE GAGE OUT OF TOLER
ANCE PO I NT I S NOT I N THE 
CALIBRATION OUT OF TOLERANCE PROGRAMMED 
UTILIZATION RANGE OF THE 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
TRSD WAIVER SUMMARY 
OUT OF SPEC CONDITION 
05-5 LATCH NO. I REQU I RED 
RELEASE LOAD OF 21. 4 LB WITH 
SYSTEM A AND 16.5 LB WITH 
SYSTEM B. MAX LOAD SHOULD 
BE 12.3 LB WITH LOAD APPLIED 
PARALLEL TO LATCH HOUSING. 
MA-0I0 FURNACE EXPERIMENT 
SYSTEM LEAKAGE WAS I. 54 X 10-6 
SCC He/SEC MAX. ALLOWABLE 
I S I X 10-7 SCC He/SEC. 
ELECTR I CAL CONN - 5.28 X 10-7 
BOLTED FLANGE - 9.0 X 10-7 
RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE 
TOOL AND LOAD CONFIGURATION 
CONDITIONS EXISTING WHEN 
APPLYING LOAD PARALLEL TO LATCH 
HOUSING RESULT IN INCONSISTENT 
AND INACCURATE TEST RESULTS. 
TESTS USING QUAL TEST TOOLING TO 
APPLY LOAD PARALLEL TO X-AXI S 
MORE CLOSELY SIMULATES FLIGHT 
CONDITIONS AND PROVI DES MORE 
ACCURATE RESULTS. RELEASE LOAD 
WITH BOTH SYSTEMS WAS 9.3 LB; 
SHOULD BE 8.8 LB PER MA0208-3511. 
TH I S RELEASE FORCE I S NOT DETR 1-
MENTAL TO SYSTEM OPERATION. 
TH I S AMOUNT OF LEAKAGE I S NOT 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
TRSD WAIVER SUMMARY 
WAIVER NO. 
LO-PO-III-06 
OUT OF SPEC CONDITION 
NO I SE I NTERFERENCE NOTED ON 
TV V I DEO WHEN PROCES 5 I NG 
AMPLI FI ER WAS SWITCHED TO 
BYPASS MODE. 
LO-PO-III-07 INVERTER AND SPS CONTROL 
BOX MOTOR SW I TCHES EX -
CEEDED 70 MS TRANSFER 
TIME. 
LO-PO-III-08 CM RCS HEll UM TANK 
TEMPERATURES WENT BELOW 
40 DEG F DURING VENTING. 
(CM A TANK 31 DEG, CM B 
TANK 33 DEG) 
LO-PO-III-09 QUAD D PRIMARY NO.2 
OUTLET PRESSL'RE WAS 176 
PSIG; SHOULD BE 177 MIN. 
RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE 
INTERFERENCE EXISTS ONLY IN BYPASS 
MODE WHICH IS A FAILURE MODE AND 
THEN CAN BE ELIMINATED BY TURNING 
OFF THE SYNCH STR I PPER BOX I N THE DM. 
TH I 5 PERFORMANCE I S ACCEPTABLE FOR 
THE ASTP MISS I ON. FI LTERS HAVE BEEN 
ADDED TO TV CAMERAS. 
FAI LURE MODE ANALYS IS I ND I CATE~ 
THAT PERFORMANCE IS ACCEPTABLE 
FOR FLI GHT. ALL SWITCHES RETURNED 
TO SPEC REQU IREMENT AFTER 
ADDITIONAL CYCLING. 
IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION SHOWED NO 
EVI DENCE OF CONDENSATION ON HARDWARE. 
01 SCREPANCY DOES NOT COMPROMI SE 
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE AND DOES NOT 
WARRANT HARDWARE REPLACEMENT. 
North American 
Space Operations 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
TRSD WAIVER SUMMARY 
, 
OUT OF SPEC CONDITION RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE 
QUAD A PROPELLANT I SOLATION VALVES WERE CYCLED SIX TIMES 
VALVES LEAKED 50 SCC/15 MIN; AND LEAKAGE DECREASED TO 
SHOULD BE 25 seC/15 MIN MAX. 18 SCC/15 MIN. 
QUAD A He ISOLATION VALVE VALVES ARE ONLY USED AS EMERGENCY 
LEAKAGE WAS 90 SCCJ30 MIN. SHUT-OFF DURING MISSION. IN THIS 
QUAD B He I SOLATION VALVE EVENT THE PRESSURE INCREASE RE-
LEAKAGE WAS 55 SCCt30 MIN. SULTING FROM LEAKAGE I S TOLERABLE 
LEAKAGE SHOULD BE BECAUSE OF CONTINUOUS USE OF RCS 
60 SCC/HR MAX. FOR ATTITUDE CONTROL DURING MISSION. 
CM RCS SYSTEM 2 TEST PORT FITTING DOES NOT SEE PRESSURE UNTIL 
TPI8 LEAKAGE WAS 1.7 X 10-6 LAST HOUR OF FLI GHT. POSS I BLE LEAK-
SCC/SEC (IND.); SHOULD BE AGE WILL NOT If DETR I MENTAL TO SY STEM 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
TRSD WAIVER SUMMARY 
OUT OF SPEC CONDITION RATIONALE FO
R ACCEPTANCE 
CM RCS BURST 01 SC HOUS ING FITTING DO
ES NOT SEE PRESSURE 
LEAKAGE WAS: UNTIL LAST 
HOUR OF FLIGHT. 
SY S. I - I. 05 X 10-6 SCC/SEC UNO.) POSSIBLE LEAKAGE WILL NO
T BE 
SYS. 2 - 2.25 X 10-7 SCC/SEC (IND.) DETRIMENTAL TO SYSTEM P
ER-
SHOULD BE: I X 10-7 SCC/SEC FORMANCE AN
D IS BELOW LIQUID 
MAX (IND.) LEAKAGE THRESHOLD. 
North American 
Space Operations 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
[AUNCH CRITICAL SPARES SUMMARY 
ALL CSM & GSt: LAUNCH 




41~ Space Division p.~ Rockwell international 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 






































, .. j 
5 
.-;': :~.. . ,', :-: - .. ::-. - - . · .. ·t·· r _:T"': 
ASTP CSM III FRR 
KSC CHECKOUT HISTORY 
-, .. ~ -- '....,..,.."",..--.,-' .... 
-... -. 
I 
---.... :/": __ ~ __ ~'_.v .. '._. 
,SEP, 19,741 O~T NOV D~C J,AN ,197,5 FEB H~R APR I M~~l 
~ CM-SM ARRIVAL AT KSC 
10 
~ MATE CM TO SM 
30 31 
I I TCP K0070 COMBINED SYSTEHS TEST 
29 
2 19 
'--_-..II TCP K0048 SIM ALT TEST 
6 16 
CJ TCP K0034 t4ANNED AL T TEST 
19 28 
r:::JTCP K8241 HGA/EXP INTERFACE TEST 
3 
6. CSM/SLA MATE 
17 
6. OM ARRIVAL AT KSC 
6. MOVE TO VAB 
24 
7 20 ~ r40VE TO PAD 
L::::JTCP K0072 OM SYSTEM TEST TCP K0005 INT 3 20 
SYSTEM TEST I I 4 20 C" . I MA01 0 FURNACE I NSTL 
.... :~~ 
17 6. DS5 ARRIVAL AT KSC 
2 A DS/DM MATE 
10 16 
c::J TCP K0072 DOCKING SYSTEM TEST 
27 5 
c::J TCP K0073 DOCKING TEST 
10 
6. OM C2F2 
24 27 CJ DM/SLA MATE 
'1' Rockwell International 
Space Division 
27 29 
Tep K0028 FRT C 
55AP123235A 

























", .,- r::r -'. 
A3TP CSM III FRR 
SIGNIFICANT HARDWARE MODIFICATIONS AT KSC 
DATE COMPLETED MODIFICATION 
11-5-74 CORRECT WIRING IN IRIG TIMING FOR X-RAY EXPERIMENT 
11-11-74 UDL CONTROL OF ATS-6! ASTP POWER AMPLIFIERS 
1-6-75 INSPECT AND CHANGE SELECTED THREADED FASTENERS TO PROV I DE 
PROPER ENGAGEMENT IN NUT LOCKING FEATURE 
1-13-75 DS STR I KER PLATE CHANGE TO PROV I DE INCREASED RAMP SLOPE 
1-28-75 ADD SU IT TO CAB IN DELTA-P TRANSDUCER TO REPLACE ORIG INAL 
2-11-75 RELOCATE DOPPLER ANTENNA TO OPPOS ITE S I DE OF DMo 
ADD CORK RAMP AND RTV SEAL TO INSTALL BOLTS ON SM 
DOPPLER ANTENNA 
2-12-75 MA-0I0 FURNACE INSTALLATION 
• VENT LINE 
• MOUNTING INSERTS 
• CABLE RELOCATION 
• HERMETICALLY SEALED VENT AND ISOLATION VALVES 
2-17-75 TEST FUSIBLE LINKS AND INSPECT SWIVEL BEARINGS IN EXPo DOORS 
2-24-75 ADD RF FILTER BETWEEN VHF-FM TRANSCE IVER AND ANTENNA 
North Amencan 
Aerospace Group 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
SIGN!FICANT HARDWARE MODIFICATIONS AT KSC 
~ 













ADD BLOCKING DIODE TO ELIMINATE OMNI A SNEAK CIRCUIT 
ISOLATE GROUNDING OF VIDEO COAX SHIELD SYSTEM IN OM 
• LI FT JUMPER WI RE ON TB 102 
,. I SOLATE SAFETY WI RE ON ADJACENT COAX CONNECTORS 
FLOODLIGHT RELOCATION FOR IMPROVED TV LIGHTING 
PROVIDE SLA 18 MODIFICATIONS TO ACCOMMODATE OM INSTALLATION 
• PROVIDE TRUSS SUPPORTING STRUCTURE AND TlEDOWNS 
• PROVI DE MECHANICAL AND ORDNANCE RETENTION AND 
SEPARATION SYSTEMS 
• PROVI DE SEPARATION SEQUENCING CIRCUITRY 
• PROVI DE DOCKING TARGET INSTALLATION 
• DELETE LM FLYAWAY UMBILICAL ASSEMBLY 
ADD CORK TO SM 
ADD PYRO BUS TIE CIRCUIT BREAKER TO PANEL 229 
North American 
Space Operations 
41~ Space Division .,.~ Rockwell International 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
SIGN I FICANT HARDWARE REPLACEMENTS 
ITEM FAILURE 
--
QD 64 LEAKAGE 
QD 65 LEAKAGE 
02 SURGE TANK LEAKAGE THRU SEAT 
I SOLATION VALVE 
MAIN 02 REGULATOR LEAKAGE THRU SHUT-OFF VALVE SEAT 
ASSEMBLY 
C&W MATR IX ASSY SUSPECTED SHORT TO GROUND 










INTERNAL FASTENER PROBLEM 
INCORRECT PRESSURE INDICATION 
DURING CABIN PRESSURE TRANSIENTS 
UN IT SUBJECTED TO OVERTEMPERATURE 
41~ Space Division p.~ Rockwellinternattonal 
I 
-
DOC UMENTA T I ON 
DR SIC 0029 
DR SIC 0030 
DR SIC 0049 
DR DM 0019 
DR SIC 0070 








SIC TPS 19, SAR 276 
DR SIC 0104 
DR SIC 0130 
1 , 
162 l . 
-"j 
.. 
.., i'*'"oi •..• "we' H' ". n +r .' * •. 
... .... ~_, .. '.",--~ ... ~~.L"""' ... ".--~.~-""'"""""""": .. ~_~ ••. ~ __ ~_._...t:: .... _~._. __ ._ ..... _ .... _ ... _~ .. --""'-' .~ 

















QUAD A FUEL 
PRESSURE 
TRANSDUCER 
1-22-75 VIDEO TAPE 
RECORDER 
2-5-75 FLOODLIGHT ASSY 
2-6-75 HGA REED SW ITCH 
2-14-75 DM INTERIOR WIRE 
HARNESS 
2-24-75 CONTROL UN IT 
3-5-75 THERMAL CONTROL 
TAPE 
BMAG 
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f 
ASTP CSM III FRR 
S IGNI FI CANT HARDWARE REPLACEMENTS 
FAILURE DOCUMENTATION 
.. 
LEAK I N REFERENCE BELLOWS DR SIC 010: 
TAPE INDI CATOR DR SIC 0059 
DIM FILAMENT DR DM 0052 
DALMO VICTOR MOD SIC TPS 62, SAR 291 
I NTERrv~ I TTENT CONNECT I ON ON P6 DR DM 0061 
COAX SHIELD 
RESOLVER WI RE BROKEN DR SIC 0150 
COVER FILM ADHESION DR SIC 0037 
STI CTiON TEST DR SIC 0039, TPS 8, 
SAR 246, 292 
SUSPECTED FAULTY TRANSFER DR SIC 0055 
-
, i 
~~ Space Division 
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PANEL I DIGITAL 
EVENT TIMER 
PANEL 306 DIG IT AL 
EVENT TIMER 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
SIGNIFICANT HARDWARE REPi..i\CEMENTS 
FAILURE 
YAW ATIITUDE ERROR OUT OF 
TOLERANCE (LOW) 
HIGH RESI STANCE IN YAW RESOLVER 
TIMING ERROR OF ONE MINUTE IN 2 HOURS 
CONTROL SHAFT B I NO I NG 
DI D NOT RESET FROM ABORT SIGNAL 
PAINT MISSING FROM 4 DIGIT IN TENTHS 
MINUTES WINDOW 
TIMING ERROR 20 MINUTES; SHOULD BE 
18 MINUTES 




DR SIC 0162 
DR SIC 0162 
DR SIC 0\63 
DR SIC 0164 
DR SIC 180 
DR SIC H55 
DR SIC 197 















ASTP CSM III FRR 
KSC OPEN MODIFICATIONS 
FINAL STOWAGE MODS - EQU I P, LABEL, VELCRO CHANGES 
COMPLETE BY 6-5-75 
North American 
Aerospactl Group 
41~ Space Division r.~ RockwelllnternatJOnal / 165 
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ASTP CSM III FRR 
OPEN TESTING 
1975 
I ----J~N - ----- I J~L 
2 6 
t::::::l TCP K0076 OM SERVICING 
3 
A CSM & OM C2F2 
4 20 
c--~---- , TCP K0052/K0038 PROP SYSTEM VERIF & HYPER LOAD 
23 3 
___




A STOW CM 
3 15 
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